Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The regulation of lobbyists

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach.Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence.Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962).The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Congleton, R.D. (1986). Rent-seeking aspects of political advertizing.Public Choice 49: 249–263.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R. (1984). Prices and sanctions.Columbia Law Review 84: 1523–1560.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holcombe, R.G. (1986). Non-optimal unanimous agreement.Public Choice 48: 229–244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koford, K.J. (1982). Centralized vote-trading.Public Choice 39: 245–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • McConnell, G. (1966).Private power and American democracy. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCormick, R. and Tollison, R. (1981).Politicians, legislation, and the economy: An inquiry into the interest group theory of government. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker, J. (1989). Criminal sentencing policy for organizations: The unifying approach to criminal penalties.American Criminal Law Review 26: 513–604.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, S. (1984). Constituent interest and congressional voting.Journal of Law & Economics 17: 181–210.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weingast, B.R., Shepsle, K.A. and Johnsen, C. (1981). The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics.Journal of Political Economy 89: 642–664.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, George Mason University, 22201-4498, Arlington, VA

    Margaret F. Brinig & Linda Schwartzstein

  2. Department of Economics, Florida State University, 32306, Tallahassee, FL

    Randall G. Holcombe

Authors
  1. Margaret F. Brinig
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Randall G. Holcombe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Linda Schwartzstein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, and a referee of this journal.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Brinig, M.F., Holcombe, R.G. & Schwartzstein, L. The regulation of lobbyists. Public Choice 77, 377–384 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047876

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047876

Keywords

Search

Navigation