Abstract
This paper develops a model to explain candidates' strategic decisions to provide or withhold information about policy positions in the course of an election campaign. The analysis treats this problem as a game of imperfect information. Attention is focused on modeling voter suspicion of candidates whose positions are ambiguous. Specific numerical examples illustrate that candidate decisions about providing information via informative advertising depend upon candidate policy preferences, campaign fund endowments, partisan reputations, and incumbency status. The model also provides theoretical underpinnings for empirical findings regarding the effects of campaign advertising.
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John Chilton, George Chressanthis, Thomas Cooper, Joseph Harrington, William Keech, Timothy McKeown, and Robert Reid provided helpful and appreciated comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also acknowledge the research assistance of Joilson Dias, Rob McGregor, and Paulino Teixeira.
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Chappell, H.W. Campaign advertising and political ambiguity. Public Choice 79, 281–303 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047774
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047774