Abstract
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J. (1992). Competitive lobbying for legislators' votes.Social Choice and Welfare 9: 229–257.
Baysinger, B., Ekelund, R., Jr. and Tollison, R. (1980). Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society. In Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Browning, E. (1980). On the welfare cost of transfers. In Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Buchanan, J., Tollison, R. and Tullock, G. (Eds.) (1980).Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
Cough, J., Atkinson, K. and Shughart, W. (1992). Ethics laws and outside earnings of politicians: The case of Alabama's legislator-educators.Public Choice 73: 135–145.
Cox, G. (1987).The efficient secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crain, W.M. and Tollison, R. (1980). The size of majorities.Southern Economic Journal 46: 726–734.
Denzau, A. and Munger, M. (1986). Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests get represented.American Political Science Review 80: 89–106.
Denzau, A., Riker, W. and Shepsle, K. (1985). Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated voting and home style.American Political Science Review 79: 1117–1134.
Dougan, W. and Munger, M. (1989). The rationality of ideology.Journal of Law and Economics 32: 119–142.
Ferejohn, J. and Calvert, R. (1984). Presidential coattails in historical perspective.American Journal of Political Science 28: 127–146.
Hillman, R. and Riley, J. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers.Economics and Politics 1: 17–39.
Inoguchi, T. and Iwai, T. (1987).Zoku giin no kenkyu [A study of “tribal representatives”]. Tokyo: Nippon keizai shimbun sha.
Kalt, J. and Zupan, M. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics.American Economic Review 74: 279–300.
Kau, J. and Rubin, P. (1979). Self-interest, ideology, and logrolling in congressional voting.Journal of Law and Economics 22: 365–384.
Kelman, M. (1988). On democracy-bashing: A skeptical look at the theoretical and empirical practice of the Public Choice movement.Virginia Law Review 74: 199–273.
Landes, W. and Posner, R. (1975). The independent judiciary in an interest-group perspective.Journal of Law and Economics 18: 875–901.
Lott, J., Jr. (1987). Political cheating.Public Choice 52: 169–186.
McChesney, F. (1987). Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation.Journal of Legal Studies 16: 101–118.
McCormick, R. and Tollison, R. (1980). Wealth transfers in a representative democracy. In Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Mikva, A. (1988). Foreword [to symposium on public choice].Virginia Law Review 74: 167–177.
Nash, J. (1950). The bargaining problem.Econometrica 18: 155–162.
Nelson, D. and Silberberg, E. (1987). Ideology and legislator shirking.Economic Inquiry 25: 15–25.
Noonan, J. (1984).Bribes. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Parker, G. (1992). The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?Public Choice 73: 167–181.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation.Journal of Law and Economics 19: 211–240.
Peltzman, S. (1984). Constituent interest and congressional voting.Journal of Law and Economics 27: 181–210.
Rasmusen, E. (1988). Entry for buyout.Journal of Industrial Economics 36: 281–299.
Rasmusen, E. (1992). An income-satiation model of efficiency wages.Economic Inquiry 30: 467–478.
Rasmusen, E., Ramseyer, J.M. and Wiley, J. (1991). Naked exclusion.American Economic Review 81: 1137–1145.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978).Corruption: A study in political economy, New York: Academic Press.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model.Econometrica 50: 97–109.
Sasago, K. (1988).Seiji shikin [Political capital]. Tokyo: Seijo shiso sha.
Shaviro, D. (1990). Beyond public choice and public interest: A study of the legislative process as illustrated by tax legislation in the 1980s.University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139: 1–123.
Snyder, J. (1991). On buying legislatures.Economics and Politics 3: 92–109.
Tullock, G. (1980a). Efficient rent seeking. In Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Tullock, G. (1980b). Rent seeking as a negative-sum game. In Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Tullock, G. (1990). The costs of special privilege. In J. Alt and K. Shepsle (Eds.),Perspectives on positive political economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, L. and Kogan, H. (1943).Lords of the levee: The story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Olin Foundation and the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State at the University of Chicago, the comments of Jeff Lange, Daniel Lowenstein, George Michaelides, Frances Rosenbluth, participants in the Econometric Society 1990 Winter Meetings and the UCLA Political Economy Lunch Group, and especially the generous encouragement and comments of John Wiley. Much of this work was done while the authors were at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Harvard Law School, the University of Tokyo School of Law, UCLA's Anderson Graduate School of Management, the UCLA School of Law, and Yale Law School.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rasmusen, E., Ramseyer, J.M. Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators. Public Choice 78, 305–327 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047761
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047761