Abstract
The literature on incumbency advantage has focused on margin as an indicator for electoral security. But while electoral margin is a goodex ante measure, it is a poorex post measure of security. Further, existing work has not integrated the choice of retirement with changes in the level of security. To improve the specification and definition of “marginality”, a multinomial LOGIT model is proposed where the dependent variable is categorical. Account is therefore taken of all the ways a Representative's term in office can end, including reelection, defeat, retirement, or pursuit of other office. The sample includes all U.S. Representatives elected for the first time between 1948 and 1978. The results indicate that (1) margin in the previous election is a significantex ante proxy for the probability of electoral defeat, and (2) while the electoral safety of all incumbents in the House has been increased, the increases are greater for members elected for the first time in the period since 1965.
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The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of James Friedman, Timothy McKeown, Terry Sullivan, and other participants at a workshop of the Faculty Working Group in Political Economy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors alone.
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Coates, D., Munger, M.C. Win, lose, or withdraw: A categorical analysis of career patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948–1978. Public Choice 83, 95–111 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047686
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047686