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A problem about make-believe

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Private Bag, Auckland, New Zealand

    Frederick William Kroon

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  1. Frederick William Kroon
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Kroon, F.W. A problem about make-believe. Philos Stud 75, 201–229 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989582

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989582

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