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Never say never

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Abstract

I. An argument is presented for the conclusion that the hypothesis that no one will ever decide a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent. II. A distinction between sentences and statements blocks a similar argument for the stronger conclusion that the hypothesis that I have not yet decided a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent, but does not block the original argument. III. A distinction between empirical and mathematical negation might block the original argument, and empirical negation might be modelled on Nelson's strong negation, but only on intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions. IV. Intuitionists may have to accept the original argument, and therefore be committed to a dubious view of time on which there cannot be merely inductive evidence for statements about the infinite future.

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  1. University College, OX14BH, Oxford, U.K.

    Timothy Williamson

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  1. Timothy Williamson
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Williamson, T. Never say never. Topoi 13, 135–145 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00763512

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