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The first version of this paper, entitled ‘Some Limitations of Rationality’, was presented to the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association in the spring of 1983. A shorter version was presented under the same title at the American Philosophical Association meetings, December 1983 (see 1983abs, p. 615), and has been circulating in manuscript form. Other versions have been presented at the Institute for Social Choice, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, in the summer of 1984, at the University of Connecticut, and at Duke University. The main changes here are in the last two sections, where the structure of the personal and group principle models are discussed at somewhat greater length than before. I am grateful for comments and discussion of my ideas to S. Kripke, H. Kuhn, D. K. Lewis, T. Scanlon, J. Troyer, D. Gauthier, A. Gibbard, and C. Bicchieri.
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Gilbert, M. Rationality, coordination, and convention. Synthese 84, 1–21 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485004
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485004