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Assertion, denial, and the Liar Paradox

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine, 92717, Irvine, CA, U.S.A.

    Terence Parsons

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  1. Terence Parsons
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Parsons, T. Assertion, denial, and the Liar Paradox. J Philos Logic 13, 137–152 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00453019

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