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Power structure and cardinality restrictions for paretian social choice rules

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    E. W. Packel

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  1. E. W. Packel
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Support from National Science Foundation Grant SES 81-06215 is gratefully acknowledged

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Packel, E.W. Power structure and cardinality restrictions for paretian social choice rules. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 105–111 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452882

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452882

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