Abstract
Everyday bargaining problems are often solved by tossing a coin. A solution for two-person bargaining problems is axiomatized, which is a Pareto-optimal generalization of this coin tossing method. The super-additive solution of Perles and Maschler is also shown to be a generalization of this method. Various properties of our solution are studied, including continuity and risk sensitivity, and compared with properties of other solutions discussed in the literature.
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This study was financed by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. I like to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments.
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Salonen, H. A solution for two-person bargaining problems. Soc Choice Welfare 2, 139–146 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00437314
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00437314