Summary
The revision of subjective probability often is characterized by an underestimation of those events, that are contradictory to a subject's presently favored alternative (Inertia Effect). Two possible explanations of the Inertia Effect as postulated by Pitz et al. (1967), the Commitment hypothesis and the Expectancy hypothesis, were tested by examination of the contradictory predictions that can be derived about the strength of the Inertia Effect as a function of the sequential position of a first disconfirming event. The data lent support to the Commitment hypothesis as an explanation of the Inertia Effect.
Zusammenfassung
Der Prozeß der Revision subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten ist häufig durch ein Unterschätzen des Effektes jener Ereignisse gekennzeichnet, die der von einer Person favorisierten Alternative widersprechen (Inertia Effekt). Zwei von Pitz et al. (1967) aufgestellte Hypothesen über die Ursachen des Inertia Effektes, die Commitment Hypothese und die Expectancy Hypothese, wurden anhand der aus ihnen ableitbaren entgegengesetzten Vorhersagen über den Zusammenhang zwischen der Stärke des Inertia Effektes und der sequentiellen Position eines ersten widersprechenden Ereignisses, überprüft. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse sprechen für das Zutreffen der Commitment Hypothese als Erklärung des Inertia Effektes.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Literatur
Beach, L. R.: Probability magnitudes and conservative revisions of subjective probabilities. J. exp. Psychol. 77, 57–63 (1968).
Brehm, J. W., Cohen, A. R.: Explorations in cognitive dissonance. New York: Wiley 1962.
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., Savage, L. J.: Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research. Psychol. Rev. 70, 193–242 (1963).
Festinger, L.: A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston: Row, Peterson 1957.
—: Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press 1964.
Geller, E. S., Pitz, G. F.: Confidence and decision speed in the revision of opinion. Org. Behav. hum. Perf. 3, 190–201 (1968).
Gibson, R. S., Nicol, E. H.: The modifiability of decisions made in a changing environment. Decision Sciences Lab., Electronic Systems Div., Air Force Systems Command, USAF, 1964.
Kozielecki, J.: The mechanism of self-confirmation of hypothesis in a probabilistic situation. In Symposium 25: Heuristic processes in thinking. International Congress of Psychology, Moscow, 1966, pp. 86–95.
Peterson, C. R., Miller, A. S.: Sensitivity of subjective probability revision. J. exp. Psychol. 70, 117–121 (1965).
—, Schneider, R. J., Miller, A. J.: Sample size and the revision of subjective probabilities. J. exp. Psychol. 69, 522–527 (1965).
—, DuCharme, W. M.: A primary effect in subjective probability revision. J. exp. Psychol. 73, 61–65 (1967).
—, Swensson, R. G.: Intuitive statistical inferences about diffuse hypotheses. Org. Behav. hum. Perf. 3, 1–11 (1968).
Phillips, L. D., Edwards, W.: Conservatism in a simple probability inference task. J. exp. Psychol. 72, 346–354 (1966).
—, Hays, W. L., Edwards, W.: Conservatism in complex probability inference. IEEE Trans. Hum. Fact. Electron., HFE 7, 7–18 (1966).
Pitz, G. F.: Information seeking when available information is limited. J. exp. Psychol. 76, 25–34 (1968).
—: Use of response times to evaluate strategies of information seeking. J. exp. Psychol. 80, 553–557 (1969).
—, Downing, L., Reinhold, H.: Sequential effects in the revision of subjective probabilities. Canadian J. Psychol. 21, 381–393 (1967).
—, Geller, E. S.: Revision of opinion and decision times in an information-seeking task. J. exp. Psychol. 83, 400–405 (1970).
—, Reinhold, H., Geller, E. S.: Strategies of information seeking in deferred decision making. Org. Behav. hum. Perf. 4, 1–19 (1969).
Pruitt, D. G.: Informational requirements in making decisions. Amer. J. Psychol. 74, 433–439 (1961).
Schum, D. A.: Prior uncertainty and amount of diagnostic evidence as variables in a probabilistic inference task. Org. Behav. hum. Perf. 1, 31–54 (1966).
- Goldstein, I. L., Southard, J. F.: The influence of experience and information fidelity upon posterior probabilities estimation in a simulated threat-diagnosis system. United States Air Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories Technical Report, No. 65-25(a) (1965).
Wheeler, G., Beach, L. R.: Subjective sampling distributions and conservatism. Org. Behav. hum. Perf. 3, 36–46 (1968).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Diese Untersuchung wurde finanziert aus Sondermitteln des Sonderforschungsbereiches Sozial- und wirtschaftspsychologische Entscheidungsforschung der Universität Mannheim.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Grabitz, H.J. Zur Beziehung von Inertia Effekt und sequentieller Position widersprechender Ereignisse bei der Revision subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Psychol. Forsch. 35, 35–45 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00424473
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00424473