Abstract
From the perspective of parents, redistributive taxation can be seen as social insurance for their children, for which no private alternative exists. Because private insurance comes too late during a person's life, it cannot cover the same risks as social insurance. Empirically, 85% of social insurance covers risks for which no private insurance would have been available. Redistributive taxation can be efficiency enhancing, because it creates safety and because it stimulates income generating risk taking. However, it also brings about detrimental moral hazard effects. Both the enhancement of risk taking and the moral hazard effects tend to increase the inequality in the economy, and, under constant returns to risk taking, this increase is likely to be strong enough even to make the net-of-tax income distribution more unequal. Optimal redistributive taxation will either imply that the pie becomes bigger when there is less inquality in pre-tax incomes or that more redistribution creates more post-tax inequality.
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The author gratefully acknowledges reserach assistance by Claudio Thum and useful comments by two anonymous referees. The paper is a broadened and non-technical discussion that draws on previous writings by the author on the subject. See in particular Sinn (1995).
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Sinn, HW. Social insurance, incentives and risk taking. Int Tax Public Finan 3, 259–280 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00418944
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00418944