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Intrinsic/extrinsic

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Abstract

Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Monash University, 3168, Clayton, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    I. L. Humberstone

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  1. I. L. Humberstone
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Humberstone, I.L. Intrinsic/extrinsic. Synthese 108, 205–267 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413498

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