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Vann McGee's counterexample to modus ponens

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Conclusion

After rejecting some unjustified criticism of McGee's claim about modus ponens, I argued for two conditionals: If the Adams-Appiah theory of conditionals is correct, then modus ponens is saved from McGee's counterexample. If the Lewis-Jackson theory is correct, the same holds. Furthermore, I raised some doubts whether the antecedents of these conditionals are true. But, if one of them were, then, by modus ponens, modus ponens would be generally valid.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Christian Piller

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  1. Christian Piller
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Piller, C. Vann McGee's counterexample to modus ponens. Philosophical Studies 82, 27–54 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355293

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