Abstract
Pollution is a by-product of production, is only gradually dissolved by the environment, and crosses national borders. The market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution. In practice, governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra-national social planning. Absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges, less cleaning-up activities and more pollution. Appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis. Attention is also paid to investment in clean technology. The debate between optimists, who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy, and pessimists can be analysed in this way.
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van der Ploeg, F., de Zeeuw, A.J. International aspects of pollution control. Environmental and Resource Economics 2, 117–139 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00338239
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00338239