Summary
Cooperative behavior during predatorinspection visits of the guppy (Poecilia reticulata) was examined. Wild caught guppies from Trinidad were tested on two types of mirror. In one treatment individual guppies were tested using a long mirror that ran parallel to the path toward the predator. In the second treatment, guppies were tested with a shorter mirror that was placed at an angle of thirty-two degrees to the path toward the predator. Guppies in both mirror treatments showed consistent behavior throughout a trial, with subjects in the straight-mirror treatment spending more time near the predator. It appears that guppies employ a “conditional-approach” strategy during predator inspections. The conditional-approach strategy instructs a player to swim toward the predator (inspect) on the first move of a game and subsequently only to move forward if the other player swims beside it. “Conditional-approach” is analogous to a TIT FOR TAT strategy, the difference being that the conditional-approach strategy makes no assumptions about the player's payoff matrix.
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Dugatkin, L.A. Do guppies play TIT FOR TAT during predator inspection visits?. Behav Ecol Sociobiol 23, 395–399 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303714
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303714