Abstract
This research tests Gilligan's hypothesis that men are more likely to consider moral dilemmas chiefly in terms of justice and individual rights, whereas women are more likely to be chiefly concerned with questions of care and relationships with others. In addition, we have investigated the effects of dilemma content upon orientation of moral judgment. Protocols from interviews with 50 college students, half women and half men, to three moral dilemmas were coded according to moral orientation. Results indicated that both moral orientations were widely used by both men and women, but that women were more likely to employ prodominantly care considerations. In a test of mean differences in proportion of justice responses, content of the specific moral dilemma showed a strong influence upon moral reasoning. Results suggest that both gender and situational factors need to be considered in our understanding of moral reasoning.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baumrind, D. Sex differences in moral reasoning: Responses to Walker's (1984) conclusion that there are none. Child Development, 1986, 57, 511–521.
Broughton, J. M. Women's rationality and men's virtues: A critique of gender dualism in Gilligan's theory of moral development. Social Research, 1983, 50, 597–642.
Bussey, K., & Maughan, B. Gender differences in moral reasoning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1982, 42, 701–706.
Furby, L. Psychology and justice. In R. L. Cohen (Ed.), Justice: Views from the social sciences. New York: Plenum, 1986.
Gilligan, C. In a different voice: Women's conception of the self and of morality. Harvard Educational Review, 1977, 47, 481–517.
Gilligan, C. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Haan, N., Block, J., & Smith, B. Moral reasoning of young adults. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 183–201.
Holstein, C. B. Irreversible, stepwise sequences in the development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females. Child Development, 1976, 47, 51–61.
Keniston, K. Young radicals. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.
Kohlberg, L. From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press, 1971.
Kohlberg, L. Moral stages and moralization. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976.
Lyons, N. Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality. Harvard Educational Review, 1983, 53, 125–145.
Milgram, S. Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
Murphy, J. M., & Gilligan, C. Moral development in late adolescence and adulthood: A critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. Human Development, 1980, 23, 77–104.
Nails, D. Social-scientific sexism: Gilligan's mismeasure of man. Social Research, 1983, 50, 643–664.
Nucci, L. P., & Nucci, M. S. Children's social interactions in the context of moral and conventional transgressions. Child Development, 1982, 53, 401–412.
O'Malley, M. N., & Greenberg, J. Sex differences in restoring justice: The down payment effect. Journal of Research in Personality, 1983, 17, 174–185.
Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press, 1965. (Originally published in 1932)
Simpson, E. Emile's moral development: A Rousseavian perspective on Kohlberg. Human Development, 1983, 26, 198–212.
Walker, L. J. Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. Child Development, 1984, 55, 677–691.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The authors wish to thank Lita Furby for her comments on the manuscript.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rothbart, M.K., Hanley, D. & Albert, M. Gender differences in moral reasoning. Sex Roles 15, 645–653 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00288220
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00288220