Abstract
This essay points out that Popper's theory of the objectivity of science is ambiguous: it is not clear whether it provides a guarantee of correct evaluations of theories or only a means of uncovering errors in such evaluations. The latter approach seems to be a more natural extension of Popper's fallibilist theory and is needed if his learning theory is adopted. But this leads to serious problems for a fallibilist theory of science.
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Wettersten, J.R. Traditional rationality vs. a tradition of criticism: A criticism of Popper's theory of the objectivity of science. Erkenntnis 12, 329–338 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00216103
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00216103