Abstract
Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences defined on the set of lotteries generated from a finite set of basic prospects into a social preference. These preferences are assumed to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis and are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Harsanyi's Theorem says that if Pareto Indifference is satisfied, then the social utility function must be an affine combination of the individual utility functions. This article considers the implications for Harsanyi's Theorem of replacing Pareto Indifference with Weak Pareto.
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I am grateful to Charles Blackorby, David Donaldson, Philippe Mongin, and an anonymous referee for their comments. The final version of this article was written while I was the Hinkley Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University. Research support was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Weymark, J.A. Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle. Soc Choice Welfare 10, 209–221 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182506
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182506