Abstract
This paper develops a Coase-like solution of the problem of inducing Pareto optimal behavior in the presence of reciprocal externalities. In place of Coasean direct compensation between the parties to an externality problem, actors strategically match each other's externality-producing activity, and thus induce counterparts to internalize the external benefits or costs of their actions. The analysis suggests a general framework for analyzing social interactions in the presence of reciprocal externalities. As an application of the theory, a solution of the duopoly problem is noted.
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We are indebted to L. Danziger, D. Samet, participants in faculty seminars at Bar-Ilan and New York Universities and at the University of Maryland, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are our own.
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Guttman, J.M., Schnytzer, A. A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching. Soc Choice Welfare 9, 73–88 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00177674
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00177674