Abstract
Harel and Nitzan recently formulated a resolution scheme for Sen's Pareto libertarian paradox, where libertarian decision-making entitlements actually change hands through the voluntary exchange of rights-endowments. Being a rigorous formalization of “the strong libertarian tradition of free contract as advocated by Buchanan and Barry”, this scheme serves as a natural target for our attempt to evaluate the logical capability and ethical nature of this tradition. It will be shown that this proposed scheme can hardly qualify, logically as well as ethically, as a “libertarian resolution” of the Pareto libertarian paradox.
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Suzumura, K. On the voluntary exchange of libertarian rights. Soc Choice Welfare 8, 199–206 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00177658
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00177658