The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?

Conclusion

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that low-cost suppliers of political favors receive the highest honoraria incomes. There is no evidence that being a lawyer, acquiring a large number of committee assignments, receiving high ratings by labor unions, representing a safe district, or introducing numerous legislative bills, increases one's honoraria income in any significant way. The wider dispersal of power reduces the effects of seniority, and membership on the Finance Committee, in determining institutional power in the Senate; hence, these variables are only significantly related to honoraria income in the House. The smaller the number of suppliers in the Senate, relative to the House, means that senators obtain higher prices for their services. As a result, business groups are more willing to pay extra — a price premium — to assure that no shirking occurs.

While the distribution of honoraria has caused considerable concern and given rise to cynical explanations as to who gets them and why (see, for example, McChesney, 1987), this analysis suggests a less pejorative but empirically valid conclusion: business, and therefore honoraria, gravitate to those who can supply political favors at a lower cost than other legislators, just as low-cost suppliers gain a greater proportion of the sales in the market than those who supply the same service but at a higher price.