Conclusions
The results clearly indicate that much of the considerable variation in the pace and pattern of economic growth between the various American states is explainable by institutional arrangements amenable to revisions through public policy. The findings suggest that long run economic growth would be best served by constraining distributional coalitions, be it through constitutional restraints (e.g., balanced budget amendments, the item veto), statutory changes (e.g., subjecting coalitions like labor unions to the antitrust laws), or some other means (e.g., labor and capital fleeing distributional coalitions, such as in the movement of workers and plants to nonunion areas).
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Borcherding, T.E., Ed. (1977). Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth. Durham: Duke University Press.
Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., and Tullock, G., Eds. (1980). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Learner, E.E. (1983). Let's take the con out of econometrics. American Economic Review, 31–34.
Learner, E.E. (1985). Sensitivity analyses would help. American Economic Review, 308–313.
McCormick, R.E., and Tollison, R.D. (1981). Politicians, legislation, and the economy: An inquiry into the interest group theory of government. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
Niskanen, W.A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine Atherton.
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Vedder, R. (1982). Rich states, poor states: How high taxes inhibit growth. Journal of Contemporary Studies, 19–32.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vedder, R., Gallaway, L. Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth. Public Choice 51, 93–100 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141689
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141689