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I am indebted to James Buchanan, William Dougan, David Fand, William Mitchell, and George Stigler for helpful discussions and comments. The usual caveat applied.

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Tollison, R.D. Chicago Political Economy. Public Choice 63, 293–297 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138169

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