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George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.
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Mitchell, W.C. Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective. Public Choice 63, 283–292 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138168
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138168