Abstract
This paper challenges the assumption inherent in most models of legislative behavior — namely that congressmen are driven by the desire for reelection. I offer an alternative perspective: incumbents seek to maximize their discretionary investments and the income generated by the job. The only constraint on this behavior is that legislators provide a satisfactory level of constituency service — a product that I suggest entails slight opportunity, and few manufacturing, costs for congressmen, and one that is unlikely to lose its value with increased production. I also demonstrate that increases in salary and discretionary investments have lengthened congressional careers.
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I would like to acknowledge the advice and comments of Morris Fiorina, Kenneth Shepsle, James Gwartney, and Randy Holcombe. None of these scholars, however, bear any responsibility for the interpretations presented in this paper.
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Parker, G.R. Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior. Public Choice 63, 237–252 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138164
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138164