Abstract
This paper analyzes an attempt to reform the bail system through the development of procedures increasing the use of pre-trial release on own recognizance. A motivating question for the study is the extent to which criminal justice systems are organized to improve their performance over time. This depends upon the ability to generate new ideas, screen them, implement the good ones successfully, and diffuse those successfully implemented to other areas. How any particular reform evolves depends upon a variety of economic, political, and organizational factors. An evolutionary economic framework is used in an attempt to describe the interaction of these factors coherently. The paper suggests that (1) the reform as initially developed did represent an improvement; (2) considerable deterioration occurred over time after implementation; (3) diffusion was widespread with variable performance improvement; (4) an important benefit was the development of a spin-off reform; and (5) there is a general misorganization of resources at the local level for research and development efforts of criminal justice systems.
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Much of this research was undertaken while the author was in the stimulating environment of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University. Numerous individuals provided helpful suggestions and criticisms during the course of this study; I am grateful to them all. Robert Goldfarb, Merton Peck, Daniel Freed, and C.B. McGuire provided detailed criticisms which were enormously helpful. Particular thanks are due Richard Nelson for giving me a good credit rating as my intellectual debt to him continues to grow. Finally, I would like to thank the public and private officials who, by responding frankly to my interview queries, have made this study possible.
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Friedman, L.S. The evolution of a bail reform. Policy Sci 7, 281–313 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137625
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137625