Abstract
The existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate's stock of brand name. This simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent's campaign spending and how well he does.
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Lott, J.R. Does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents?: The theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name. Public Choice 72, 87–92 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135548
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135548