Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Regret, recrimination and rationality

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Allais, M. (1953) ‘Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque; critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole Americaine’ Econometrica, 21, pp. 503–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, D. E. (1982) ‘Regret in decision making under uncertainty’ Operations Research, 30, pp. 961–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellsberg, D. (1961) ‘Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, pp. 643–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn, P. (1983) ‘Nontransitive measurable utility’ Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 26, pp. 31–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grether, D. M. and Plott, C. R. (1979) ‘Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon’ American Economic Review, 69, pp. 623–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) ‘Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk’ Econometrica, 47, pp. 263–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P. (1971) ‘Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions’ Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, pp. 46–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1982) ‘Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty’ Economic Journal, 92, pp. 805–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1983a) ‘Regret theory and measurable utility’ Economics Letters, 12, pp. 19–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1983b) ‘A rationale for preference reversal’ American Economic Review, 73, pp. 428–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgenstern, O. (1979) ‘Some reflections on utility’ In Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox (Ed. M. Allais and O. Hagen) Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savage, L. J. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A. K. (1982) Choice, Welfare and Measurement, London: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, NR4 7TJ, Norwich, England

    Robert Sugden

Authors
  1. Robert Sugden
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Second International Conference on the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory (FUR-84) at Venice in June 1984. The problems dealt with in the paper have been the subject of discussion between Graham Loomes and me over several years, and so many ideas in the paper may originally have been his. It should not be assumed, however, that he endorses all the arguments I put forward here.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sugden, R. Regret, recrimination and rationality. Theor Decis 19, 77–99 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134355

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134355

Search

Navigation