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A market mechanism for electric power transmission

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Abstract

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electric Power Research Institute, 3412 Hillview Avenue, 94303, Palo Alto, CA

    Hung-Po Chao & Stephen Peck

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  1. Hung-Po Chao
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  2. Stephen Peck
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Additional information

The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.

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Chao, HP., Peck, S. A market mechanism for electric power transmission. J Regul Econ 10, 25–59 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133357

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133357

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