Abstract
In this paper we analyze the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments.
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We are grateful to Kevin Grier, James C. Miller III, William Miller, Dennis C. Mueller, and Scott Thomas for helpful discussions. The usual caveat applies.
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Crain, W.M., Tollison, R.D. & Leavens, D.R. Laissez-faire in campaign finance. Public Choice 56, 201–212 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130271
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130271