Abstract
In this paper we examine empirically the determinants of membership in Common Cause and Public Citizen, two “public interest” lobbies. We find that the only variable significantly associated with membership in these organizations is number of college graduates in a state. We also examine voting by Congressmen on five issues on which one of the lobbies had taken a stand, and we find that in four cases the number of members in a state in the lobby is significantly associated with voting on the bill by Congressmen from the state, after adjusting for all economic variables. We interpret these results to indicate that participation by citizens does have some impact on the legislative process.
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Kau, J.B., Rubin, P.H. Public interest lobbies: membership and influence. Public Choice 34, 45–54 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125751
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125751