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Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, 22030, Fairfax, VA

    Roger D. Congleton

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  1. Roger D. Congleton
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The author would like to thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for financial support at the Center for Study of Public Choice and Gordon Tullock for helpful suggestions on a previous draft of this paper. A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 1987 meetings of the Public Choice Society.

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Congleton, R.D. Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy. Public Choice 62, 101–118 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124328

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