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Constitutional change and agenda control

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  1. Arthur T. Denzau
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Washington University. I would like to thank my research assistant, Kevin Sigrist, for the considerable help he has provided and my colleagues Barry Weingast, Bill Riker, and Ken Shepsle for helpful comments on previous drafts.

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Denzau, A.T. Constitutional change and agenda control. Public Choice 47, 183–217 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00119357

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