Skip to main content
Log in

Public sector unions and public spending

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public sector. Based on public goods theory, our paper models how unions influence the supply of and demand for public sector activities. On the demand side, public sector unions are special interests which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers; on the supply side, they exert pressure to maintain and expand monopoly powers. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Ashenfelter, O. (1971). The effect of unionization on wages in the public sector. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 24: 191–202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baird, C. (1991). On strikers and their replacement. Government Union Review 12: 1–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W.J. (1967). Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: The anatomy of urban crisis. American Economic Review 57: 415–426.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.T. and Orzechowski, W. (1983). The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence. Public Choice 41: 271–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergstrom, T.C. and Goodman, R.P. (1973). Private demands for public goods. American Economic Review 63: 280–296.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borcherding, T.E. and Deacon, R.T. (1972). The demand for the services of non-federal governments. American Economic Review 62: 891–901.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borcherding, T.E., Bush, W.C. and Spann, R.M. (1977). The effects of public spending on the divisibility of public outputs in consumption, bureaucratic power, and the size of the tax-sharing group. In T.E. Borcherding (Ed.), Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunelli, S.A. and Cox, W. (1992). America's protected class: Why excess public employee compensation is bankrupting the States. The State Factor, 1–31. Washington, DC: American Legislative Exchange Council, February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1977). The expanding public sector: Wagner squared. Public Choice 32: 147–150.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bush, W.C. and Denzau, A.T. (1977). The voting behavior of bureaucrats and public sector growth. In T.E. Borcherding (Ed.), Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • California Commission on Campaign Financing. (1985). The new gold rush: California's legislative campaigns. Los Angeles: Center of Responsive Government.

    Google Scholar 

  • Curme, M.A., Hirsch, B.T. and MacPherson, D.A. (1990). Union membership and contract coverage in the United States, 1983–1988. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44: 5–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrenberg, R.D. (1973). Municipal government structure, unionization, and the wages of fire fighters. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27 (October): 36–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, D.G. (1978). Teacher bargaining and school district expenditures: Industrial Relations 17: 216–239.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gramlich, E.M. and Rubinfeld, D.L. (1982). Voting on public spending: Differences between public employees, transfer receipts, and private workers. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 1: 516–533.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ichniowski, C. (1980). Economic effects of the Firefighters' Union. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33: 198–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Indiana Chamber of Commerce. (1982). Unionization of government: Tug of war with the public interest. Indianapolis, Indiana. December.

  • Joulfaian, D. and Marlow, M.L. (1991). Centralization and government competition. Applied Economics 23: 1603–1612.

    Google Scholar 

  • Logan, R.R. (1986). Fiscal illusion and the grantor government. Journal of Political Economy 96: 1304–1318.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, R.A. and Musgrave, P.B. (1988). Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reder, M. (1988). The rise and fall of unions: The public sector and the private. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 89–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oates, W.E. (1985). Searching for Leviathan: An empirical study. American Economic Review 75: 748–757.

    Google Scholar 

  • Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, various years.

  • Trejo, S.J. (1991). Public sector unions and municipal employment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45: 166–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Troy, L. (1988). Public sector unionism: The rising power center of organized labor. Government Union Review 9: 1–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1974). Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy. Public Choice 19: 127–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winer, S.L. (1983). Some evidence on the effect of the separation of spending and taxing decisions. Journal of Political Economy 91: 126–140.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zax, J. and Ichniowski, C. (1988). The effects of public sector unionism on pay, employment, department budgets, and municipal expenditures. In R.B. Freeman and C. Ichniowski (Eds.), When public sector workers unionize. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

The authors thank an anonymous referee for many useful comments and suggestions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Marlow, M.L., Orzechowski, W. Public sector unions and public spending. Public Choice 89, 1–16 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114274

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114274

Keywords

Navigation