Abstract
There is an ongoing debate on whether and how the use of certain emerging weapon technologies perceived as decreasingly allowing human control over the use of force should be regulated or banned. The focus of the debate on such so-called autonomous weapon systems has from the outset been too narrow and misguided. The frame of ‘autonomy’ and the resulting weapon-centric focus on control, neglects that the effects of the military use of weapons may be controlled in many more ways than by restricting certain weapons or technologies. This chapter argues that the legal requirement to exercise control over the effects of the use of force, may be complied with by virtue of a range of (human) decisions preceding, during and even after employment of a particular weapon.
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Notes
- 1.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or: CCW), opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983).
- 2.
Sharkey (2007) Robot Wars are a Reality, The Guardian, 18 August 2007. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/aug/18/comment.military. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 3.
See the mission statement of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, see https://www.icrac.net/about-icrac/. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 4.
See Williams 2011, p. 2.
- 5.
United Nations General Assembly 2013, Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47.
- 6.
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 28 May 2013, Consensus: killer robots must be addressed, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/05/nations-to-debate-killer-robots-at-un/. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 7.
For a general overview of the discussions in the context of the CCW on the topic of ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems’, see https://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 8.
See for example Backstrom and Henderson 2012, pp. 488–490.
- 9.
United Nations 2019a, p. 3.
- 10.
See for instance: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/7972-fully-autonomous-weapons; https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/; and https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 11.
ICRC 2015.
- 12.
Roorda 2015, p. 163.
- 13.
For details of the Harpy, see the website of IAI: Harpy: Autonomous Weapon for All Weather. https://www.iai.co.il/p/harpy. Accessed 18 March 2020.
- 14.
See also the contribution of Boothby in Chap. 18 in this volume.
- 15.
See also the contribution of Myjer in Chap. 17 in this volume.
- 16.
For a restrictive definition, see https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/. For a wider definition: Arms control law is a “branch of public international law [and] consists of the rules and principles of international law related to the control of armaments—‘control’ being understood as encompassing the whole range of prohibitions of armaments quantitative and qualitative arms limitations as well as obligations to disarm.” Den Dekker 2008, p. 75.
- 17.
Preamble, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975) (Biological Weapons Convention). A similar phrase is included in the Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW), opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983).
- 18.
See for example: Articles 2 and 4, Biological Weapons Convention; above n 17; Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 28 November 2003, 2399 UNTS 100 (entered into force 12 November 2006) (Protocol V CCW); Articles 4, 5, 6(7)(c), 7(1)(b) and (c), and 9 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), opened for signature 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS 211 (entered into force 1 March 1999); Articles 5(3) and (4), 9(2), 10(2) and (3), 12 (2)(b)(i) and (3)(b)(ii), and 14 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II CCW) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 3 May 1996, 2048 UNTS 93 (entered into force on 3 December 1998); and Articles 17(2), 25, 27, 30(1), 33(4), 42(2), 46(2), 47(2)(d), 49(2), 54(5), and 70(1) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1970) (AP I).
- 19.
See for example: AP I, above n 18, Article 58.
- 20.
See AP I, above n 18, Article 87.
- 21.
AP I, above n 18, Articles 48–67.
- 22.
AP I applies to international armed conflict, yet most of its provisions on the conduct of hostilities contained in this section are considered customary IHL and therefore equally applicable in non-international armed conflict.
- 23.
AP I, above n 18, Article 51(1).
- 24.
AP I, above n 18, Article 57(1).
- 25.
AP I, above n ICRC 18, Article 57(2)(a)(ii). See also Article 58 titled “Precautions against the effects of attacks”.
- 26.
See generally Corn 2015, pp. 419–466.
- 27.
AP I, above n 18, Article 36.
- 28.
AP I, above n 18, Article 51(4)(c).
- 29.
UN General Assembly, Resolution 2932 1972: “the massive spread of fire through incendiary weapons is largely indiscriminate in its effects”.
- 30.
Jensen 2020, p. 28.
- 31.
ICRC 2015, p. 3.
- 32.
Article 36, 2013.
- 33.
For a general overview with regard to meaningful human control, see UNIDIR 2014.
- 34.
Neslage 2015, p. 176.
- 35.
Crootof 2016, p. 55.
- 36.
Neslage 2015, p. 177.
- 37.
Marauhn 2018, p. 207.
- 38.
Marauhn 2018, p. 212.
- 39.
ICRC 2016, p. 8.
- 40.
Human Rights Watch 2016, p. 2.
- 41.
Article 36 2013, pp. 3–4. Although also still adding that a positive action by a human operator is required for individual attacks.
- 42.
UNIDIR 2014, pp. 5–7.
- 43.
Horowitz and Scharre 2015, p. 4.
- 44.
Ekelhof 2016.
- 45.
Roorda 2015, p. 160.
- 46.
McFarland 2018.
- 47.
Schwarz 2018.
- 48.
McFarland 2018.
- 49.
Marauhn 2018, p. 217.
- 50.
UNIDIR 2014, p. 4: Both the United States and the United Kingdom “have explicitly stated policy acknowledging the necessity of either human control or human judgment in relation to autonomous weapon systems indicates that some of the notions at the heart of the concept of Meaningful Human Control are already accepted principles by some States.”
- 51.
United Nations 2019b, pp. 3–4. https://undocs.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2019/3. Accessed 19 March 2020.
- 52.
Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 283.
- 53.
- 54.
Which is explicitly prohibited in AP I, above n 18, Article 51(2).
References
Articles, Books and Other Documents
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Corn GS (2015) War, law, and the oft overlooked value of process as a precautionary measure. Pepperdine Law Review 42:419–466.
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IAI (undated) Harpy: Autonomous weapon for all weather. https://www.iai.co.il/p/harpy. Accessed 18 March 2020.
ICRC (2015) Statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CCW Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems, Geneva, 13 April 2015, available at: https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4CE346B40DDBF000C1257E2600616A59/$file/ICRC+general+statement+CCW+LAWS+expert+meeting+13+04+2015+FINAL.pdf. Accessed 18 March 2020.
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Treaties
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or: CCW), opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983).
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), opened for signature on 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975).
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), opened for signature 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS 211 (entered into force 1 March 1999).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1979).
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V CCW), opened for signature 28 November 2003, 2399 UNTS 100 (entered into force 12 November 2006).
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II CCW) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 3 May 1996, 2048 UNTS 93 (entered into force on 3 December 1998).
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van den Boogaard, J.C., Roorda, M.P. (2021). ‘Autonomous’ Weapons and Human Control. In: Bartels, R., van den Boogaard, J., Ducheine, P., Pouw, E., Voetelink, J. (eds) Military Operations and the Notion of Control Under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-395-5_20
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