Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Constraints on Joint Action

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition

Part of the book series: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality ((SIPS,volume 4))

Abstract

There exist many competing philosophical definitions of joint action and no clear criteria to decide between them; so far the search for definitions has by and large been a semantical enterprise rather than an empirical one. This chapter describes and assesses several constraints that could help converge towards a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for joint action. The tightness constraint favours definitions that fit joint actions in which the links between agents are as relaxed as possible, so as to better pinpoint the conceptual core of jointness. The developmental constraint asks for definitions based on realistic psychological states that could be entertained by agents less cognitively developed than ideal human beings. The motor constraint holds that definitions should refer to psychological mechanisms involved in actual human coordination. These first three constraints are discussed and dismissed, mainly because they manage to establish vague limits at best (for various reasons). I then introduce a fourth one, the efficiency constraint, based on the fact that most of our joint actions are generally successful, and according to which definitions should involve conditions that help justify this success. Finally, the rational and evolutionary versions of the efficiency constraint are examined and defended against objections.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    I will not survey the existing definitions and their conceptual links, or absence thereof, here. There is already ample literature on this topic, and any such discussion would only be incidental to this paper. For my purpose, acknowledging the absence of a consensus is enough of a starting point.

  2. 2.

    Such intuitions will resurface in the later discussion when we examine the justifications for specific constraints on joint action.<

  3. 3.

    See for instance Paternotte (forthcoming).

  4. 4.

    See Butterfill (submitted), Kutz 2000 and Tollefsen (2005).

  5. 5.

    Note that a neutralist stance about pluralism is not incompatible with the search for a minimal definition of joint action. Here ‘minimal’ should be understood in its mathematical sense: a minimal element such that no other element comes ‘before’ with respect to a given ordering. Just as sets can have several distinct minimal elements, there could be several minimal definitions of joint action that fit the same general desiderata.

  6. 6.

    With exceptions to be mentioned below.

  7. 7.

    In particular, the adequacy approach is not committed to a bottom-up approach. Constraints are not supposed to feature as additional ingredients in definitions but as tools that help assess the adequacy of such ingredients.

  8. 8.

    For instance, the efficiency constraint presupposes that ‘joint action’ refers to reliably successful collective action (see Sect. 8.5). I thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

  9. 9.

    This does not mean that other kinds of constraints on joint action are to be excluded. The paper does not aim to provide an exhaustive list of possible constraints, but to discuss those that are at least implicitly present in the literature and/or for which empirical data can be relevant (more on this in the concluding section).

  10. 10.

    Unless stated explicitly, criticisms of the possible constraints on joint action are not criticisms of the works I take to exemplify these constraints, which do not aim to constrain joint action and so should not be assessed with regard to their failure to do so.

  11. 11.

    There is common knowledge of a fact when it is public or transparent among a group; or, as the traditional description goes, when everyone knows that everyone knows (ad lib.) that everyone knows it.

  12. 12.

    Bratman, Gilbert, Tuomela and Miller all include common knowledge in most of their definitions.

  13. 13.

    In effect, the tightness constraint targets minimality by extending the number of admissible cases and thus decreasing their common features. The other constraints are more deserving of their name, as they affect such ingredients directly rather than indirectly.

  14. 14.

    Such claims typically concern 12–18-month (and possibly older) children, whose ability for joint action is assessed by evidence of coordinated behaviour, as they lack a theory of mind (Tollefsen 2005) or are not able to ‘think about minds’ (Butterfill 2011) yet.

  15. 15.

    I argue in Paternotte (2011) that the accusations of unrealism based on common knowledge are misguided.

  16. 16.

    Likewise for the sections on the tightness and motor constraint. The paper’s conclusion touches upon possible combination of constraints.

  17. 17.

    Most authors that study the motor mechanisms implied in human cooperative activity does not make strong claims about the consequences for definitions of joint action should be. So here again, the criticisms made against the motor constraint do not jeopardise – or even concern – these often very interesting results.

  18. 18.

    Where ‘better off’ may depend on subjective standards

  19. 19.

    In what follows, I talk equivalently of regular/frequent/general/reliable success or of reliability tout court. Differences between these expressions are irrelevant to the general argument.

  20. 20.

    ‘Our deflationary aim is to identify a notion of joint action which can be characterised without appeal to shared intention or any other distinctive ingredient’ (Butterfill submitted, 7), where ‘a distinctive ingredient is one not required for characterizing individual action’ (Ibid.).

  21. 21.

    Also note that a mutual benefit is not a shared or common goal; rather, it provides an opportunity for a common goal to arise.

  22. 22.

    There are at least two exceptions to this trend, to be discussed below.

  23. 23.

    Recalling the discussion on developmental constraint, it may seem that the objection vanishes as agents with weak cognitive abilities may not be able to act jointly. However, this only concerned agents such that their abilities create doubts as to whether they can act jointly. We have no such doubt for normal human adults, as their very behaviour is what motivates the concept of joint action.

  24. 24.

    In Sect. 8.5, the discussion of efficiency makes clear that benefits can be defined subjectively.

  25. 25.

    See for instance Skyrms 2003 for an evolutionary analysis of Stag Hunt situations.

  26. 26.

    Tuomela (2007) is a notable exception.

  27. 27.

    This is the familiar point that adapted traits are not necessarily still adaptive.

  28. 28.

    Skyrms (2010) is a good example in the case of communication.

  29. 29.

    Pinker (2012) and the following replies provide a nice overview of the current state of the debate.

  30. 30.

    Here I am indebted to an anonymous referee.

  31. 31.

    I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing up these points.

References

  • Bacharach, M. 1999. Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation. Research in Economics 53: 117–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bacharach, M. 2006. In Beyond individual choice: Teams and frames in game theory, ed. N. Gold and R. Sugden. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bourke, A. 2011. Principles of social evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bratman, M. 1992. Shared cooperate activity. The Philosophical Review 101(2): 327–341.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bratman, M. 1993. Shared intention. Ethics 104: 97–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buss, L. 1987. The evolution of individuality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Butterfill, S.A. 2011. Joint action and development. Philosophical Quarterly 62(246): 23–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Butterfill, S.A. submitted. What is joint action? A modestly deflationary approach.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R.V., and A. Whiten (eds.). 1988. Machiavellian intelligence – Social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Calcott, B., and K. Sterelny (eds.). 2011. Major transitions in evolution revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chant, S., and Z. Ernst. 2007. Group intentions as equilibria. Philosophical Studies 133(1): 95–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, E. 2011. Plant individuality and multilevel selection theory. In The major transitions revisited, ed. K. Sterelny and B. Calcott. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, E. 2013. The multiple realizability of biological individuals. The Journal of Philosophy CX(8): 413–435.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, R. 1982. The extended phenotype. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. 1989. The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, A., and A. Grafen. 2009. Capturing the superorganism: A formal theory of group adaptation. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 22: 659–671.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, M. 1989. On social facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gintis, H. 2009. Game theory evolving: A problem centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith, P. 2009. Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hakli, R., K. Miller, and R. Tuomela. 2010. Two kinds of we-reasoning. Economics and Philosophy 26(3): 291–320.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. Econometrica 47: 313–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knoblich, G., and N. Sebanz. 2008. Evolving intentions for social interaction: From entrainment to joint action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363: 2021–2031.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knoblich, G., S.A. Butterfill, and N. Sebanz. 2011. Psychological research on joint action: Theory and data. In The psychology of learning and motivation, vol. 54, ed. B. Ross, 59–101. Burlington: Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kutz, C. 2000. Acting together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard, Smith J., and E. Szathmáry. 1995. The major transitions in evolution. Oxford: W. H. Freeman (now Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Michod, R.E. 1999. Darwinian dynamics: Evolutionary transitions in fitness and individuality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, S. 2001. Social action – A teleological account. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Okasha, S. 2006. Evolution and the levels of selection. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, K.R., and E. Spelke. 2008. Foundations of cooperation in young children. Cognition 108: 222–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternotte, C. 2011. Being realistic about common knowledge: A Lewisian approach. Synthese 183(2): 249–276.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternotte, C. 2014. Minimal cooperation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44(1):45–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. 2005. Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity and relation to common knowledge. In Joint attention: Communication and other minds, ed. N.M. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, and J. Roessler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinker, S. 2012. The false allure of group selection. Edge. http://edge.org/conversation/the-false-allure-of-group-selection.

  • Pradeu, T. 2010. What is an organism? An immunological answer. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32: 247–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queller, D.C., and J.E. Strassmann. 2009. Beyond society: The evolution of organismality. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 364: 3143–3155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., and A.M. Chammah. 1965. Prisoner’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. 1990. Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions in communication, ed. P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. 1995. The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms, B. 2003. The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms, B. 2010. Signals: Evolution, learning, and information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sober, E., and D.S. Wilson. 1998. Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behaviour. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber, D. 2000. Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective, ed. D. Sperber, 117–137. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny, K. 2012. The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tollefsen, D. 2005. Let’s Pretend! Children and joint action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35(1): 75–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M., M. Carpenter, J. Call, T. Behne, and H. Moll. 2005. Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28: 675–691.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuomela, R. 2000. Cooperation – A philosophical study. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuomela, R. 2007. The philosophy of sociality – The shared point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Whiten, A., and R.V. Byrne (eds.). 1997. Machiavellian intelligence II: Extensions and evaluations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, G.C. 1966. Adaptation and natural selection: A critique of some current evolutionary thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wimmer, H., and J. Perner. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition 13(1): 103–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. I thank the audience of the Fifth Joint Action Meeting (Berlin, 2013).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany

    Cédric Paternotte

Authors
  1. Cédric Paternotte
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cédric Paternotte .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom

    Mattia Gallotti

  2. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

    John Michael

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Paternotte, C. (2014). Constraints on Joint Action. In: Gallotti, M., Michael, J. (eds) Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9147-2_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation