Abstract
When we set ourselves to draw up an inventory of the world — a catalogue of all there is, was, and will or could be — we have to face two tasks. First, we have to figure out what sorts of things there are, i.e., we must identify and characterize the categories under which the items in the inventory will fall. For example, we might want to draw a distinction between such things as chairs and tables, on the one hand, and conferences, hurricanes, and stabbings, on the other. And we may wonder what to do when it comes to such things (if such there be) as numbers, jokes, haircuts, smiles, souls, shadows, and so on. The second task is to figure out, for each category, how many different things there are, i.e., how many individual items must be included in that category. Is this chair the same as the chair that was here yesterday? Is it something over and above the mereological fusion of the molecules that constitute it? Am I the same as my body? Is Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar the same event as his killing of Caesar? Is it the same as the assassination of Caesar? Is it the same as the violent assassination of Caesar? And so on.
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Notes
One author who has emphasized this sort of skepticism towards the use of logical analysis in ontology is Hacker [1982].
This paragraph elaborates on a point made in Carrara and Varzi [2000], which in turn owes much to Marconi [1979].
The fusion of a bunch of xs is defined as something that overlaps those things that overlap some of the xs. See Simons [1987], Chapter 1, and Casati and Varzi [ 1999 ], Chapter 3.
For example, the first case (an object vs. the fusion of its parts) is illustrated by Simons [1987] and Lowe [1989]; the second case (an object vs. its constitutive matter) is illustrated by Johnston [1992], Baker [1997], and Thomson [1998]; and the event case is illustrated in various forms by Goldman [1971], Thomson [1971], and Brand [1977].
One can formulate these statements in terms of counterpart theory, if desired, but here I will go along with the standard formulation in terms of cross-world identity.
This is the line taken by Gibbard [1975] and by Yablo [1987] and recently defended by Gallois [1998].
For further elaborations I refer to Varzi [2000] and Pianesi and Varzi [2000].
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Varzi, A.C. (2002). Words and Objects. In: Bottani, A., Carrara, M., Giaretta, P. (eds) Individuals, Essence and Identity. Topoi Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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