Abstract
Bayesianism is a powerful current of thought in quite a number of different areas, which include: artificial intelligence, decision theory, economics, philosophy of science, and statistics. In the present paper, I will deal only with Bayesianism in statistics. In fact since the beginning of this century, the principal controversy within statistics has been between Bayesianism and the so-called classical statistics. I will begin therefore by attempting to characterise, in outline at least, these two approaches to statistics.
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Gillies, D. (2001). Bayesianism and the Fixity of the Theoretical Framework. In: Corfield, D., Williamson, J. (eds) Foundations of Bayesianism. Applied Logic Series, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_15
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