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Preference Logic

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 4))

Abstract

The study of general principles for preferences can, if we so wish, be traced back to Book III of Aristotle’s Topics. Since the early twentieth century several philosophers have approached the subject of preferences with logical tools, but it is probably fair to say that the first complete systems of preference logic were those proposed by Sören Halldén in 1957 and Georg Henrik von Wright in 1963. [Rescher, 1968, pp. 287–288; Halldén, 1967; von Wright, 1963]. The subject also has important roots in utility theory and in the theory of games and decisions.

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  1. Philosophy Unit, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

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  1. King’s College, London, UK

    D. M. Gabbay

  2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    F. Guenthner

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Hansson, S.O. (2001). Preference Logic. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_4

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