Abstract
The influence of Charron’s De la Sagesse on Descartes’ thought has been noted by many scholars at least since Gilson’s classical commentary on the Discours de la Méthode.1 Few, however, have examined the issue in which this influence is most interesting and important: scepticism and doubt. The exception is Richard Popkin one of whose first publications on early modern scepticism deals precisely with the issue.2 Popkin shows that the idea of a methodic doubt in the sense of a doubt conceived as means to something else is quite central in Charron. He points out two basic differences between Charron and Descartes on methodic doubt: the radical nature of the Cartesian doubt and the fact that in Descartes, in contradistinction to Charron, the result of the sceptical elimination of belief is not a tabula rasa. This second difference is generalized in Popkin’s History of Scepticism to the whole tradition of scepticalfiideism in the period. In Descartes, he says, “the process of doubting compels one to recognize the awareness of oneself, compels one to see that one is doubting or thinking, and that one is here, is in existence. The discovery of true knowledge is not miraculous, not a special act of Divine Grace. Instead the method of doubt is the cause rather than the occasion of the acquisition of knowledge.
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References
Descartes, René, Discours de la Méthode. Texte et Commentaire par Etienne Gilson (Paris: Vrin, 1987 — fiirst edition: 1925).
The following are the main scholars who have pointed out textual and thematic connections between Descartes and Charron: Sirven, J., Les années d’apprentissage de Descartes: 1596–1628. Paris: Vrin, 1928, pp. 262–273 (provisional morals);
Boase, Alan, The Fortunes of Montaigne. A history of the Essays in France, 1580–1669. London: Methuen, 1935, pp. 209–237 (a number of issues in the Discours and the Cogitationes privatae);
Battista, Anna Maria, Alle Origini del pensiero politico libertino: Montaigne e Charron. Milano: Giuffré, 1966, pp. 205–206 (politics);
Adam, Michel, Etudes sur Pierre Charron. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1991; Id., “René Descartes et Pierre Charron”, Revue Philosophique, vol. 4, 1992, pp. 467483 (several connections, including the suggestion that Charron’s doubt is methodical, intermediary between Montaigne’s and Descartes’ );
Rodis-Lewis, Geneviève, “Descartes et Charron”, Archives de Philosophie, vol. 57, 1994, pp. 4–9; Id., Descartes. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1995), pp. 71–76 (the influence of Charron’s Sagesse in Descartes’ intellectual autobiography presented in the Discours);
Belin, Christian, L’ŒEuvre de Pierre Charron 1541–1603. Littérature et théologie de Montaigne à Port-Royal. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1995, pp. 229–238 (generosity) and Faye, Emmanuel, Philosophie et Perfection de l’Honzme. De la Renaissance à Descartes. Paris: Vrin, 1998, pp. 293–324 (morals).
Popkin, Richard H., “Charron and Descartes: the fruits of systematic doubt”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 51, 1954, pp. 831–837. It is rather odd that such an important connection has not been explored in the recent boom of Charronian scholarship. One remarkable exception is Gianni Paganini’s Scepsi Moderna. Interpretazioni dello scetticismo da Charron a Hume (Cosenza: Busento, 1991), pp. 28–29, who indicates some innovations that Charron introduces in the sceptical tradition that become crucial in Descartes’ methodic doubt, notably, the active role of the will.
Popkin, R.H., The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, p. 184.
See Gregory, Tullio, “La sagezza scettica di Pierre Charron”, De Homine, vol. 21, 1967, pp. 163-l82, and “11 libro scandaloso’ di Pierre Charron ” in Id., Etica e religione nella critica libertina. Napoli: Guida, 1986, pp. 73–107. Both essays were translated to French and published in Gregory, T., La Genèse de la Raison Classique de Charron à Descartes. Paris: PUF, 2000. Christian Belin presents an interpretation contrary to Gregory’s and — on the issue of the relation between doubt and faith — similar to Popkin’s. He says that whereas Descartes unifies wisdom and science (in contrast to Charron, as was first pointed out by Gilson), “le discours sapientiel pour Charron reste un auxiliare précieux du discours religieux, auquel il prépare ” (op. cit., p. 238). I disagree with both. Against Gregory, despite Charron’s criticism of superstition, I argue in section 3 below that his scepticism cannot be viewed straightforwardly as anti-religious. Against Belin, I hold that in Charron human beings find the perfection of their nature in sceptical epoché, and this is achieved independently and autonomously vis-à-vis Christian faith and grace (see section 2 below).
My view of Descartes’ relation to the sceptics of his time differs from Curley’s who sees in Montaigne’s scepticism a possible historical source for Descartes’ dream and deceiver arguments and the cogito as Descartes’ anti-sceptical reply. (See Curley, Edwin M., Descartes Against the Sceptics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978, in particular chapter 2). Note that I agree that Descartes’ cogito is original and anti-sceptic. What I argue is that, unlike his sceptical arguments, the cogito can be viewed as a philosophical (metaphysical) interpretation of the epoché held by French early modern sceptics. This makes Descartes’ refutation of scepticism even more suited to meet the sceptical challenge of his time.
I am not saying that Charron is not relevant for other parts of Descartes’ doctrinary philosophy. Faye finds Charron crucial in Descartes’ philosophical morals.
I do not give the exegetical analysis that would indicate Descartes’ source for such analysis is not relevant for the purpose of this article.
This is confiirmed, for example, in Boase’s chapter on Montaigne’s influence on Descartes, where most of the textual sources given are from De la Sagesse, not from the Essais.
Descartes’ early reading of Charron challenges Curley’s hypothesis that Descartes becomes aware of the sceptical challenge posed by the sceptics of his time only after he wrote the Regulae (op. cit., pp. 37ff).
“La science est un tresbon et utile baston, mais qui ne se laisse pas manier à toutes mains … [elle] enteste et affolit … les esprits foibles et malades, polit et parfait les forts et bons naturels ” (Charron, Pierre, De la Sagesse. Paris: Fayard, 1986, p. 38). The Fayard edition is based on the second edition (1604) which contains many additions and corrections by Charron. It is referred to by the numbers of book, chapter, and page. The Fayard edition also includes Charron’s Petit Traité de Sagesse, in which he resumes the work and replies to objections.
Descartes, Œiuvres, ed. by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: J. Vrin, 1974–1986, vol. X, p. 184 (for short, AT, followed by the numbers of volume and page).
Gouhier, Henri, Les premières pensées de Descartes. Contribution à 1’histoire de l’antiRenaissance. Paris: Vrin, 1958, p. 50, n. 18; see also Sirven, Boase, Adam (1992) and Rodis-Lewis (1994).
Faye, op. cit., p. 295, a point that was first made by Boase in op. cit., p. 224. Descartes says in the Discours that his goal is to “marcher avec assurance en cete vie ” (AT, VI, 10). See also the second maxim of Descartes’ provisional morals (discussed below) and the conclusion of the morals: “je m’avisay de faire une reveuë sur les diverses occupations qu’ont les hommes en cete vie, pour tascher a faire chois de la meilleure; & je pensay que je ne pouvois mieux que de continuër en celle la mesme ou je me trouvois, c’est a dire, que d’employer toute ma vie a cultiver ma raison, & m’avancer, autant que je pourrois, en la connoissance de la verité, suivant la Methode que je m’estois prescrite ” (AT, VI, 27). Commenting on the discovery of a copy of De la Sagesse purportedly given to Descartes precisely in the winter of 1619 by a Jesuit named Molitor (see the note by F. de Buzon in the Archives de philosophie, vol. 57, 1992, pp. 1–3), Rodis-Lewis suggests that this “personne sage ” is this Jesuit (1995, p. 76). I find more likely that this is Charron himself.
Belin. op. cit.. Op. 231–232.
In his commentary on the Discours, Gilson says that Descartes’ conception of a human science independent of theology comes from Montaigne, Charron and the Christian stoicism of the period. The major difference according to him between the Cartesian and the Renaissance conceptions of wisdom is that while the latter is either based on erudition or empty (he cites Charron’s rejection of “wisdom ” based on erudition and memory), “[a]vec Descartes, au contraire, la pensée moderne débouche en quelque sorte de la Renaissance. En choisissant les mathématiques comme type de la science, Descartes fait passer la science de la mémoire à la raison. Il peut donc joindre ses critiques à celles de Montaigne et de Charron contre l’érudition scolaire qui garnit la mémoire sans former le jugement ” (Gilson, op. cit., p. 94).
The words and phrases in italics are those found in Charron’s Sagesse in similar contexts and with similar meanings.
To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, Descartes says that “ce que je nomme propremant Theologie ” is “ce qui depend de la revelation ” (AT, I, 144).
An heresy combated by Augustine which dismisses the consequences of original sin. Charron’s and Descartes’ replies are based on Molinism.
When Charron distinguishes human from divine wisdom and says that in De la Sagesse he deals only with the former, he says he discusses the latter in his theological works, Les Trois reritez and the Discours Chrétiens (preface, p. 28).
“I1 faut que la preud’homie, naisse en luy par luy mesme, c’est à dire, par le ressort interne que Dieu y a mis, et non par aucun autre externe estranger, par aucune occasion ou induction… je veux en mon sage une preud’homie essentielle et invencible, qui tienne de soy mesme, et par sa propre racine, et qui aussi peu s’en puisse arracher et separer, que l’humanité de l’homme; Je veux que jamais il ne consente au mal” (II, 3, 421–22). Montaigne rejects “certaine image de preud’homie scholastique, serve de preceptes” and favors another one “née en nous de ses propres racines par la semence de la raison universelle empreinte en tout homme desnaturé” (Les Essais, ed. by P. Villey. Paris: PUF, 1992, III, 12, p. 1059).
The passage of the Discours which suscitated the accusation of Pelagianism is the following: “nostre volonté ne se portant a suivre ny a fuir aucune chose, que selon que nostre entendement luy represente bonne ou mauvaise, il suffit de bien juger, pour bien faire, & de juger le mieux qu’on puisse, pour faire aussy tout son mieux, c’est a dire, pour acquerir toutes les vertus, & ensemble tous les autres biens, qu’on puisse acquerir ” (AT, VI, 28). The similarity with Charron’s position is remarkable.
See also the letter to Mersenne of March 1642: “Pelagius a dit qu’on pouvoit faire de bonnes oeuvres & meriter la Vie eternelle sans la Grace, ce qui a esté condamné de l’Eglise; & moy, je dis qu’on peut connoistre par la raison naturelle que Dieu existe, mais je ne dis pas pour cela que cette connoissance naturelle merite de soy, & sans la Grace, la Gloire surnaturelle que nous attendons dans le Ciel. Car, au contraire, il est evident que, cette Gloire estant surnaturelle, il faut des forces plus que naturelles pour la meriter ” (AT, III, 544).
Although Charron, like Descartes, conceives of theology as supernatural revealed theology and uses this conception to claim the autonomy of philosophy, he is not as coherent as Descartes on this separation between divine and humane wisdom for he argues that human wisdom is necessary — although not sufficient, else he would be Pelagian — for receiving grace (see II, 3, 434). In my article “Descartes e a Teologia: entre o Molinismo e o Agostinismo”, Analytica, vol. 2, 1997, pp. 187–201), 1 suggest that Descartes fiinds in the Molinist theologians his argument against the charge of Pelagianism. I now think that Descartes’ relation to Molinism may have been mediated by his close and early reading of Charron.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), tr. by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1933. I agree with Curley that the crucial sceptical challenge posed to Descartes is diaphonia: “there is nothing which is not disputed and consequently (Curley’s emphasis), which is not doubtful ” (op. cit., p. 18, n. 21).
“For, after our solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists ” (PH I.62).
Like Montaigne, Charron uses extensively the 10th Aenesidemean mode based on the discrepancy of values, customs, and beliefs (PH I.145–163 ), that was fed, reinforced, and enlarged at the time by the reports coming from the new world. This is the main mode through which Charron’s disciple La Mothe Le Vaver develons his scenticism
“Mais ils [the dogmatists] veulent que l’on se sous-mette souverainement et en dernier ressort à certains principes, qui est une iniuste tvrannie ” (II. 2. 402).
I return to this point in connection to Descartes’ first moral rule.
See Charron, Les Trois Veritez, chapter 1 “Discours de la cognoissance de Dieu ” and his Discours Chrestiens, “de la cognoissance de Dieu ” in Œuvres (Genève: Slatkine, I970).
“Qui est celuy au monde qui aye droit de commander et donner la loy au monde, sassujetir [sic] les esprits, et donner les principes qui ne soyent plus examinables, que l’on ne puisse plus nier ou douter, que Dieu seul le Souverain esprit et le vray principe du monde, qui seul est à croire pour ce qu’il dit? Tout autre est sujet à l’examen et à opposition, c’est foiblesse de s’y assujettir. Si l’on veut que je m’assujetisse aux principes, je diray … accordés vous premierement de ces principes, et puis je m’y sous-mettray ” (II, 2, 403). See also I, 40, 279: “il n’y a point de principes aux hommes, si la divinité ne les leur a revelé”. Both the use of the Pyrrhonian mode of hypothesis to vindicate intellectual freedom against dogmatism (viewed as tyranny) and the exclusion of revelation from the mode given the absence of parity between men and God come from Montaigne: “Or n’y peut-il avoir des principes aux hommes, si la divinité ne les leur a revelez. … Car toute presuppostion humaine et toute enunciation a autant d’authorité que l’autre, si la raison n’en faict la difference. Ainsi il les faut toutes mettre à la balance; et premierement les generalles, et celles qui nous tyrannisent ” (Essais, II, 12, 540–41). Of course this concerns only genuine divine revelation. Religion as a mere human institution often constitutes superstition, which is entirely subject to sceptical zetesis and epoché. Note also that Descartes’ exception of revealed theology from the scope of his doubt (AT VI 28) has a similar justification.
This is again a development of Montaigne: “la vraye raison et essentielle … loge dans le sein de Dieu ” (Essais, II, 12, p. 541).
F. Brahami (Le Scepticisme de Montaigne. Paris: PUF, 1997) rightly emphasizes this crucial difference but wrongly concludes that modern scepticism is totally contrary to ancient scepticism, rejecting for example, epoché. I think that the distinction of the early modern sceptics (Montaigne, Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer and Gassendi) between the natural philosophical realm and the supernatural theological allows — and even favors — the attainment of epoché in the philosophical realm. Their scepticism can be characterized as ephetic (with the exception of Gassendi’s, which is more zetetic).
That Charron’s scepticism is more Academic than Pyrrhonian is clear from the “divise ” of wisdom: “je ne sçais”. He calls the freedom of philosophizing Academic (preface), refers to his position as Academic (”d’où viennent les troubles … que des fiers, affirmatifs et opiniastres, resolus, non des Academiques, des modestes, indifferends, neutres, sursoyans, c’est à dire sages? ” — II, 2, 404) and considers Socrates the model of the ideal sage. Popkin’s thesis that the kind of ancient scepticism most influential in early modern philosophy is Pyrrhonian rather than Academic must therefore be qualified. The thesis seems true for Montaigne (although Academic scepticism is also very important in Montaigne) and false for Charron (although Pyrrhonism is very important to Charron, as shown by his use of the Agrippean modes). Charron was certainly as influential (maybe more influential) as Montaigne during the first half of the 17th century when, according to Popkin, the “crise pyrrhonienne ” (it is not called “académicienne”) occurred.
“tournoyant tousjours et tatonnant à l’entour des apparences … nous sommes nais à quester la verité: la posseder appartient à une plus haute et grande puissance ” (I, 14, 138). The phenomenon is also what the Pyrrhonians avowal and follow in practical life (PH I. 2124).
This position is also central in Charron’s disciples La Mothe Le Vayer and Gassendi. Gassendi’s fundamental objection to Descartes’ Meditations (as to Herbert of Cherbury and to the Aristotelians in his Exercitationes) is Descartes’ pretension to know the essence of the substances instead of being content with appearances
See also the Entretien avec Burman: “la mathématique accoutume aussi l’esprit à discerner entre les manières de raisonner lesquelles sont vraies et démonstratives et lesquelles probables et fausses. Car quiconque en mathématique se fonde sur la simple probabilité s’abusera et sera conduit à des absurditiés, et ainsi il verra qu’une démosntration ne saurait procéder du probable, qui en l’occurrence équivaut aux faux, mais seulement du certain. Les philosophes qui n’auraient pas fait cette expérience sont à jamais incapables de discerner, en matière de philosophie et de physique, les démonstrations des arguments probables, c’est pourquoi ils se battent presque toujours à coup de probabilités, persuadés qu’ils demeurent que des démonstrations ne sauraient être à leur place dans les sciences du réel. De là vient que les Sceptiques, et d’autres, ont cru l’existence de Dieu impossible à démontrer … alors qu’elle est au contraire parfaitement démonstrable et peut (comme aussi toutes les vérités métaphysiques) être démontrée d’une façon plus ferme que les démonstrations de mathématique ” (tr. J.-M. Beyssade. Paris: PUF, 1981, pp. 142–144).
Note that presumption here appears in the context of diaphonic established philosophy. It will not appear, according to Descartes, in the context of his new philosophy, where the work of hyperbolic doubt restored the purity of the natural light of reason, thereby eliminating any ground for conflict or diaphonia. I return to this point below, showing that Descartes takes into account Charron’s own explication of diaphonia.
Charron’s conception of the vulgar comes from Montaigne: “tout le vulgaire … aurait sa creance contourable comme une girouette: car leur ame, estant molle et sans resistance, seroit forcée de recevoir sans cesse autres impressions, la derniere effaçant tousjours la trace de la precedente. Celuy qui se trouve foible, il doit respondre, suyvant la pratique, qu’il en parlera à son conseil, ou s’en raporter aux plus sages, desquels il a receu son apprentissage ” (Essais, II, 12, pp. 570–71).
See Sirven, Boase, Rodis-Lewis (1994) and Faye.
“Aprés m’estre ainsi assuré de ces maximes, & les avoir mises a part, avec les veritez de la foy, qui ont tousjours esté les premieres en ma creance, je jugay que, pour tout le reste de mes opinions, je pouvois librement entreprendre de m’en defaire ” (AT, VI, 28).
Domenico Taranto has convincingly dispelled the outward appearance of a genuine Stoicism in Charron’s book III: he shows that it is consistent with the scepticism of the first two books. See his “Il posto dello scetticismo nell’architettonica della Sagesse” in Dini, V., and Taranto, D., eds., La Saggezza moderna: temni e problemi dell’opera di Pierre Charron. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1987, pp. 9–34.
Charron acknowledges that he has “fort servy ” of Du Vair in the chapters on the passions (I, 153) — as remarked by Renée Kogel (Pierre Charron. Genève: Slatkine, 1972, p. 30). As a matter of fact, Charron’s wisdom is more frequently considered Stoic (or more Stoic) than sceptic (see Angers, Julien-Eymard d’, Recherches sur le stoïcisme au XVle et XVII siècles. New York: Olms, 1976; Horowitz, Maryanne C., “Pierre Charron’s view of the source of wisdom”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 9, 1971, pp. 501–509; Sabrié, J.-B., De L’Himanisme au rationalisme: Pierre Charron (1541–1603). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913. In my The Christianization of Pyrrhonism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995, pp. 1922) I argue that Charron dresses his sceptical sage with Stoic cloth, so he is essentially more sceptic than Stoic. For a contrary view, see lofrida, Manlio, “A proposito della Sagesse di P. Charron”, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, serie III, vol. 8, 1978, pp. 525–564. Besides Popkin, the Italian scholars mentioned above (T. Gregory; G. Paganini; D. Taranto, and A. M. Battista) are those who consider scepticism to be more important than stoicism in De la Sagesse.
See also the Petit Traité: “Le sixiesme offiice et traict du sage qui regarde la volonté, est une forte et ferme probité et preud’hommie, laquelle naisse en luy par lui-mesme, c’est à dire par la consideration qu’il est homme ” (PT, 842). Faye and Kogel give Charron’s probable source (which could also have been Descartes’) in Du Vair: “Le bien donc de l’homme consistera en l’usage de la droite raison, qui est à dire en la vertu, laquelle n’est autre chose que la ferme disposition de notre volonté à suivre ce qui est honnete et convenable … le bien de l’homme et la perfection de sa nature consiste en une droite disposition de sa volonté à user des choses qui se présentent selon la raison ” (Philosophie Morale, pp. 6667, apud Kogel, p. 62).
“Le vray office de l’homme, son plus propre et plus naturel exercice, sa ne lus digne g occupation est de juger ” (I, 2, 389).
The originality of Charron’s defiinition of preud ’homie in face of Du Vair’s (which makes him a much more likely source of Descartes than the neo-Stoic) lies in this application of the fiirmness of the will to follow a sceptical reason.
It also takes a voluntarist will to take as false what is just doubtful (AT, VI, 31).
“pour toutes les opinions que j’avois receuës jusques alors en ma creance, je ne pouvois mieux faire que d’entreprendre, une bonne fois, de les en oster ” (AT, VI, 13). Except for the truths of faith and this provisional morals, “pour tout le reste de mes opinions, je pouvois librement entreprendre de m’en defaire ” (AT, VI, 28).
“l’epoché si confiigura nelle pagine charroniane come un moto energico di liberazione dal complesso delle credenze, moto che richiede dunque una disciplina ed un esercizio intenzionali tanto dell’intelletto quanto della volontà, secondo una linea di pensiero che giungerà sino a Descartes, con la trasformazione del dubbio da accadimento subito in metodo consapevole e riflesso ” (Paganini, G., op. cit., p. 28).
“Pour obtenir cet esprit universel, cette generale indifference, que l’on considre ces quatre ou cinq points. l. La grand inegalité, et difference des hommes…. 2. La grande diversité des loix, coustumes, meurs, religions, opinions … 3. Les diverses opinions, raisons, dires des Philosophes … 4. Ce que nous avons apprins [cic] de la descouvete du monde nouveau ” (II, 2, 407–408). Note that all these reasons of doubt are relevant to Descartes’ own personal doubt as described in the first two parts of the Discours, none of which enter in the reasons of his hyperbolic or metaphysical doubt. I return to metaphysical doubt at the end of this paper.
“Or les lois se maintiennent en credit, non par ce qu’elles sont justes, mais par ce qu’elles sont loix. C’est le fondement mystique de leur authorité ” (Essais, III, 13, 1072). See also Pascal: “La coutume (est) toute l’équitité, par cette seule raison qu’elle est reçue. C’est le fondement mystique de son autorité ” (Pensées, Lafuma edition, fragment 60).
Gilson, who remarks the presence of the maxim in De la Sagesse, points out that it “n’engage … aucunement l’adhésion de la pensée aux usages reçus et laisse intact le problème théorique de la vérité qui s’y rapporte ” (Gilson, op. cit., p. 235). This maxim is also related — as Gilson notices — to the political conservatism of Charron and Descartes. In this same chapter Charron has a paragraph “Contre les novateurs des loix”. He notes that although there are and have been many “loix au monde injustes”, people have lived with them “en profonde paix et repos ” for “la nature humaine s’accommode à tout avec le temps”. For this reason, attempts at radical social and political reform “produit tousjous plus et plustost mal que bien, il apporte des maux tout certains et presens, pour un bien à venir et incertain ” (II, 8, 498–99). Descartes says that social institutions and laws should not be reformed in the radical way he is reforming his thoughts “[p]uis, pour leurs imperfections, s’ils en ont, comme la seule diversité qui este entre eux suffit pour assurer que plusieurs en ont (a Charronian sceptical point), l’usage les a sans doute fort adoucies … Et enfin, elles sont quasi tousjours plus supportables que ne seroit leur changement ” (AT, VI, 14). See the book by A. M. Battista indicated in note 1 above for a detailed analysis of the sceptical trust of Charron’s political thought and its differences from Montaigne’s.
Paganini, op. cit., p. 30. Charron’s main source of this duality is Montaigne (Essais, II, 12, pp. 578ff).
M. Burnyeat argues that idealism is not a philosophical position tenable in the context of ancient philosophy. The “appearances” or phenomena that the Pyrrhonians accepted as guide of their practical life could not possibly be considered as (philosophical) true. Referring to Descartes’ certainty of his subjective states in the beginning of the Second Meditation, Burnyeat comments that subjective truth has arrived to stay, constituting one’s own experience as an object for description like any other ” (“Idealism and Greek Philosophy: what Descartes saw and Berkeley missed ” in Williams, M., ed., Scepticism. Aldershot: Dorthmout. 1993, pp. 38–39).
Although there is no such abyss with respect to Descartes’ own personal doubt as described in the first part of the Discours.
La Mothe Le Vayer is the most faithful disciple of Charron, understanding epoché (established mainly through the 10th trope) as practical wisdom. “Nous examinons la France, une autre partie de l’Europe, quelque chose de plus esloigné, nous figurans que tout le reste va de mesme, sans jamais faire reflexion sur l’étenduë immense de ce vaste … livre du monde, dont la lecture sert de leçon à la vraye … Philosophie. Là nous verrions qu’il n’y a rien de si constant, certain, et arresté en un lieu, dont l’opposite ne soit encores plus opiniastrement tenu ailleurs ” (“De la philosophie sceptique”, Dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens. Paris: Fayard, 1988, pp. 24–5).
“en voyasgeant, ayant reconnu que tous ceux qui ont des sentimens fort contraires aux nostre, ne sont pas, pour cela, barbares ..”. (AT, VI, 16). Charron says in the chapter on the three kinds of people that the pedants “pensent que par tout est ainsi, ou doit estre, que si c’est autrement, ils faillent et sont barbares ” (I, 43, 291). Gilson refers to Montaigne’s essay on the cannibals (I, 31): “chacun appele barbarie ce qui n’est pas de son usage ” (Gilson, op. cit., p. 291). The wording and the context of Descartes’ passage suggest that his source is Charron, not Montaigne. Charron is also the probable source of a similar passage in Gassendi’s Exercitationes: “Quanquam vulgus hic intelligo non plebeiorum hominum … sed Philosophorum communium, quibus ingenium est ita vulgare, ut vulgi instar Barbariem inclament quicquid praeconceptis semel opinionibus adversatur ” (Gassendi, Pierre, Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus aristoteleos, ed. by B. Rochot. Paris: Vrin, 1959, pp. 11–13 ).
Commentators have not taken critically Descartes’ view of the sceptics, e.g. Rodis-Lewis, who takes this passage as indicating precisely on what Descartes crucially differs from Charron (Rodis-Lewis, 1994, p. 8).
To begin with, the resolution of the will to get rid of all opinions, except those of faith, is a Charronian position. In the chapter on intellectual freedom (first disposition to wisdom), in which Charron recommends that one examine everything but assent to nothing, he says that “par toutes choses, et aucune chose (car il est dit, juger toutes choses, ne s’assurer d’aucune) nous n’entendons les veritez divines qui nos ont esté revelées, lesquelles il faut recevoir simplement avec toute humilité et soubmission … Mais nous entendons toutes autres choses sans exception ” (II, 2, 388). Further, the detached attitude that Descartes expresses in the dramaturgic model is also recommended by Charron, “demourant au mond sans estre du monde descharger son ame de tous vices et opinions populaires, et la r’avoir de cette confusion et captivité, pour la retirer à soy, et la mettre en liberté” (II, l, 379).
This comes from Montaigne’s view of the ancient sceptics. Defending Pyrrhonian epoché, Montaigne says that “la plus seure assiete de nostre entendement, et la plus heureuse, ce seroit celle là où il se maintiendroit rassis, droit, inflexible, sans bransle et sans agitation ” (Essais, II, 12, p. 562).
“Or de cette assiette de leur jugement, droicte et inflexible, recevant tous objects sans application et consentement, les achemine à leur Ataraxie, qui est une condition de vie paisible, rassise, exempte des agitations que nous recevons par l’impression de l’opinion et science que nous pensons avoir des choses ” (Essais, II, 12, p. 503).
Gassendi says that the sceptics, unlike the dogmatists, preserve freedom: “Nisi forte libertas illa nihili aestimanda est? quam qui semel adepti sunt, in asylum adeo tutum sese receperunt ” (op. cit., p. 59).
“It n’y a point de secte de Philosophie qui presente une fin plus souhaittable, ny qui conduise à un port tant à l’abry des orages et agitations, que celle-cy”, “Dialogue sur la philosophie sceptique ” in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens (Paris: Fayard, 1988), p. 60. This dialogue between Ephestion (an ephetic sceptic) and Eudoxe (a dogmatic Aristotelian) was published in 1630. Popkin (op. cit., p. 286, n. 24) and E. Mehl (”La question du premier principe dans la Recherche de la Vérité ” in Atti della giornata di studio “René Descartes - La Recherche de la érité “, Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres 1991-I, pp. 77–97) have noted some remarkable similarities with Descartes’ Recherche, beginning with the name of the characters: Epistemon (a dogmatic Aristotelian), Eudoxe (the Cartesian) and Poliandre. I have examined this issue in “Descartes e os céticos do seu tempo”, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, vol. 27; 2001, 59–80.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, tr. R. D. Hicks, The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925, Vol. 2, IX.62–63; Garasse, François, La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps, ou pretendus tels. Paris: S. Chappelet, 1623.
Gassendi, Pierre, Disquisitio metaphysica, ed. by B. Rochot. Paris: Vrin, 1962, fiirst doubt against the First Meditation, instantia 2, pp. 68–70.
“Neque putandum est eorum sectam dudum esse extinctam. Viget enim hodie quàm maxime, ac fere omnes, qui se aliquid ingenii prae caeteris habere putant, nihil invenientes in vulgari Philosophià quod ipsis satisfaciat, aliamque veriorem non videntes, ad Scepticam tranfugiunt… Quippe omnes hodierni Sceptici non dubitant quidem in praxi, quin habeant caput, quin 2 & 3 faciant 5, & talia; sed dicunt se tantum iis uti tanquam veris, quia sic apparent, non autem certo credere, quia nullis certis rationibus ad id impelluntur ” (AT, VII, 548–49). The only historically problematic claim of Descartes to Bourdin about the sceptics is that they doubt the existence of God.
See Second and Third Replies, respectively (AT, VII, 130 and 171–2), and Notae in programma quoddam (AT, VIII-2, 367).
To Reneri through pollot, April or May 1638 (AT, II, 38).
In his edition of Descartes’ philosophical works, Alquié finds “curieux qu’en ce texte la mise en jeu de celle-ci [the recovery of the integrity of natural light] soit attribuée à un grand naturel ou aux instructions de quelque sage ” (Descartes, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by F. Alquié, 3 vols. Paris: Bordas, 1992, vol. II, p. 1106, n. 2).
I note above that Descartes’ claim in Olympica that “dicta sapientum ad paucissimas quasdam regulas generales possum reduci ” (AT, X, 217) seems related to this title of book II. The reappearance of the claim in the opening paragraph of De la Recherche shows the early and deep influence of Charron in Descartes’ thought.
This brings to mind Charron’s figure of science in the frontispiece of his work, a woman who holds an open book where one reads “oui et non”, which also recalls Descartes’ Olympica (see above).
“Faiblesse ” is precisely how Charron describes the senses in book I. “De la foiblesse et incertitude de nos sens viennent ignorance, erreurs, et tout mesconte ” (I, 9, 1 12). The other major source of beliefs is hearsay and the authority of preceptors, parents, etc: “Presque toutes les opinions que nous avons, nous ne les avons que par authorité ” (I, 16, 150).
The context of the chapter is the distinctions that can be remarked among men. The first one dealt with by Charron in the previous chapter concerns the differences due to different climates and temperaments, in which Charron borrows respectively from Jean Bodin and Juan Huarte de San Juan. For the place of this distinction in De la Sagesse and its relation to the differences due to “l’esprit ” see Paganini, G., -’ Sages’, Spirituels’, “Esprits Forts’: Filosofiia dell’esprit’ e tipologia umana nell’opera di Pierre Charron ” in Dini, V., and Taranto, D., eds., op. cit., pp. 113–156.
Charron says that judging is what is most proper to man, what differs him from the beasts. All men judge, but only the sage does it perfectly (II, 2, 389–90).
“Or ne trouver pas le vray, ce n’est pas mal juger; mal juger c’est mal peser, balancer … les oppositions et contradictions raisonées sont les vray moyens d’exercer cet offiice de juger ” (II, 2, 399).
Cicero, Academica, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1933, II.8.
“porquoy à ceux cy [the sceptics] ne sera il … concedé de maintenir leur liberté, et considerer les choses sans obligation et servitude? Hoc liberiores et solutiores quod integra illis est judicandi potestas. N’est ce pas quelque advantage de se trouver desengagé de la necessite que bride les autres? ” (Essais, II.12, p. 504). This crucial statement of Cicero on Academic intellectual integrity reappears in Charron’s, La Mothe Le Vayer’s and Gassendi’s reappraisal and defense of sceptical epoché.
Labrousse, Elisabeth, Pierre Bayle, 2 vols. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963–64, vol. 2, p. 57. I argue that the notion of intellectual integrity is crucial in the sceptical appropriation of Descartes in late seventeenth century, in particular by Simon Foucher and Bayle (see “Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 58, 1997, pp. 199–220 and “Bayle’s Academic Scepticism ” in Force, J., and Katz, D., eds. Everything Connects: in conference with Richard H. Popkin. Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 264–276). Thomas Lennon finds the notion of intellectual integrity relevant for a much broader understanding of Bayle than for just his connection with scepticism (see Lennon, Thomas, Reading Bayle. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). See also Bianchi, L., “Pierre Bayle interprete di Charron ” in Dini, V., and Taranto, D., eds., op. cit., pp. 265–303.
“surseance et indifference de jugement, par laquelle l’homme considerant tout comme dict est … ne s’aheurt, ny se lie ou oblige à aucune chose, mais se tient libre, universel et ouvert à tout, tousjours prest à recevoir la verité, si elle se presente, adherent cependant au meilleur et plus vray semblable qui luy apparoit tel, disant …il semble ainsi, il y a grande apparence de ce costé-là… C’est la modestie Academique tant requise au Sage par laquelle il est tousjours prest et capable de verité et raison quand elle se presente. Cette modestie et retenuë vient du precedent, qui est juger de tous: car examinant universellement toutes choses sans passion, lon trouvera par tout de l’apparence qui arreste et empesche de precipiter son jugement ” (PT, 838–39).
It has been noticed, notably by E. Mehl (op. cit., pp. 83–91), that Descartes derives here the cogito directly from doubt, and not from thought, what makes, according to Mehl, the version of the cogito in De la Recherche a less developed one than that of the Meditations. According to Mehl, an still earlier formulation of the cogito appears as Socratic assurance in the Regulae: “si Socrates dicit se dubitares de omnibus, hinc necessariò sequitur: ergo hoc saltem intelligit, quòd dubitat; item, ergo cognoscit aliquid posse esse verum vel falsum, &c., ista enim naturae dubitationis necessarià annexa sunt ” (AT, X, 421). This formulation is quite close to Charron’s avowedly Socratic certainty that he knows nothing.
“Pour simplement vivre bien selon la nature, les bestes sont de beaucoup plus advantagées, vivent plus libres; asseurées, moderées, contentes. Et l’homme est sage qui les considere, qui s’en fait leçon et son profit; en ce faisant il se forme à l’innocence, simplicité, liberté, et douceur naturelle, qui reluit aux bestes, et est tout alterée et corrompuë en nous par nos artificielles inventions, et desbauches, abusant de ce que nous disons avoir par dessus elles, qui est l’esprit et jugement ” (I, 18, 219). Wisdom is “l’excellence et perfection de l’homme comme homme ” (preface, p. 32), that is, in epoché the intellect recovers its pure nature.
The tranquility of the mind is the “fruit et la couronne de sagesse”. Like in ancient Pyrrhonism, it is “le souverain bien de l’homme ” and is acquired through universal epoché: “La tempeste et l’orage a beaucoup moins de prinse et de moyen de nuire, quand les voiles sont recueillies, que quand elles sont au vent; s’affermir contre tout ce qui peut blesser ou heurter [bascially, opinions] … Et ainsi se tenir ferme à soy, s’accorder bien avec soy, vivre à l’aise sans aucune peine ny dispute au dedans … s’entretenir et demeurer content de soy, qui est le fruit et le propre effet de la sagesse ” (II, 12, 540–41).
“Mais, aussitost aprés, je pris garde que, pendant que ie voulois ainsi penser que tout estoit faux, il falloit necessairement que moy, qui le pensois, fusse quelque chose. Et remarquant que cet verité: je pense, donc je suis, estoit si ferme & si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des Sceptiques n’estoient pas capables de l’esbranler, je jugay que je pouvois la recevoir, sans scrupule, pour le premier principe de la Philosophie, que je cherchois’’ (AT, VI, 32).
It seems that there is no God deceiver argument to the effect that one’s whole perceptual and intellectual cognition may be false neither in the ancient nor in the medieval (see the detailed analysis in Bermúdez, José C., “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: did it have ancient or medieval antecedents?”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 17, 2000, pp. 333–360) nor in the Renaissance nor in Descartes’ contemporary sceptics. There is no dream argument in Charron. The dream argument appears in Plato’s Theaetetus, Cicero’s Academica, Sextus’ Outlines and in Montaigne’s Apologie, but not in the sense — I agree with Bermúdez’s analysis of the argument in the ancient context — that the whole external material world may not exist.
This duality also comes from Montaigne: “Il faut jouer deuement nostre rolle, mais comme rolle d’un personnage emprunté. Du masque et de l’apparence il n’en faut pas faire une essence réelle, ny de l’estranger le propre. Nous ne sçavons pas distinguer la peau de la chemise ” (Essais, III, 10, D. 1011).
Referring to Sextus’ statement of the phenomenon as the practical criterion of the sceptics, Burnyeat says that Sextus’ language is “not a language of a man afflicted with radical Cartesian doubt as to whether he has a body to act with and a world to act in at all. One’s own body has not yet become for philosophy part of the external world ” (op. cit., p. 30). Burnyeat distinguishes modern Cartesian doubt from ancient doubt arguing that unlike the latter the former is “insulated ” from practical life. See his “The sceptic in his place and time ” in Rorty, R., Schneewind, J. B., and Skinner, Q., eds. Philosophy in History. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1984, pp. 255–78. See also Paganini, op. cit., pp. 112–13, who contrasts Descartes’ position on this subject to Montaigne’s and Gassendi’s.
Wisdom is “une droicture et belle composition de tout l’homme ” (preface, p. 28 — emphasis added).
Paganini (op. cit, pp. 117–21) shows that with his hyperbolic doubt Descartes destroys the whole practical thrust of scepticism, the ancient and that of his contemporaries. This modifiication was decisive for the fate of the sceptical tradition, few today considering this philosophy as a philosophy to be lived by and not a merely abstract epistemological position.
Right aftter the passage in which Descartes attributes to the role of the “instructions of some sage ” to get rid of false opinions and “jeter les premiers fondements d’une science solide”, he says his proposal is “de mettre en evidence les veritables richesses de nos ames ” (AT, X, 496).
If Charron could not react to Descartes’ subversion of his epoché one of his disciples could and did. Gassendi was a great admirer of Charron’s De la Sagesse. His Exercitationes is largely inspired in Charron. He says in the preface that his reading of Charron gave him courage to attack the Aristotelians. His fiirst book is directly inspired in Charron. He holds to Charron’s ideal of intellectual integrity, freedom and wisdom to show the lack of all these among the Aristotelians. In a extended part of this book he shows the errors and inconsistencies in Aristotle’s works, giving textual support for Charron’s judgment of Aristotle (see De la Sagesse, preface, p. 42). In the second book he gives epistemogical content to Charron’s rejection of Aristotelian philosophy. So his reaction to Descartes’ sceptical arguments (in which I claim Descartes breaks and subverts the scepticism of his time) is most revealing. Gassendi begins (AT, VII, 257–258) praising Descartes’ goal of eliminating prejudices (which is Charronian) but rejects the way he attempts to do it, that is, through hyperbolic doubt. The fiirst problem according to Gassendi is that Descartes takes as false what is probable and this, for somebody who, like him, follows Charron in holding that man cannot get truth because truth lies in God, is just to replace a prejudice for another for whatever will be taken as truth will be for Charron and Gassendi just another prejudice: “Intellectus noster scit, cognoscitve experiundo multa apparentia ” (Exercitationes, p. 505). Second, Gassendi, like Charron, follows the probable or phenomenal so the latter cannot be regarded as false. (Actually, Gassendi proposes a new hypothetical and probabilistic science based on the phenomena, compatible with his and Charron’s scepticism). Third, Gassendi understands that Descartes’ move is anti-sceptical for it allows Descartes to claim that what he could not doubt is truth. He rejects Descartes’ sceptical arguments — the evil genius, the deceiver god, and the dream — on the grounds that they are artifiicial (note that Gassendi’s doubt is a doubt to be lived by, a doubt that leads to wisdom, this being the context in which he praises the goal of getting rid of prejudices) and deviated from tradition. Gassendi sees well — and here as elsewhere in his Disquisitio denounces — that Descartes’ anti-scepticism begins with his doubt. (See Gouhier, Henri, La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes. Paris, Vrin, 1987, p. 33).
“Ce n’est pas la verité ni le naturel des choses qui nous remue et agite ainsi l’ame. C’est l’opinion … La verité et l’estre des choses n’entre ny ne loge chez nous de soy-mesme, de sa propre force et authorité: s “il estoit ainsi, toutes choses seroient receuës de tous, toutes pareilles et de mesme façon, sauf peu plus, peu moins, tous seroient de mesme creance: et la verité qui n’est jamais qu’une et uniforme, seroit embrassé de tout le monde; Or il y a si grande diversité, voire contrarieté d’opinionns ..”. (I, 16, 149). (Cf. Montaigne: “ce que nature nous auroit veritablement ordonné, nous l’ensuivrions sans doubte d’um commun consentement ” — Essais, II, 12, p. 580). There is no diaphonia among the beasts which, because freed of opinions, remain in the realm of natural law (see note 80 above).
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Neto, J.R.M. (2003). Charron’s Epoché and Descartes’ Cogito: The Sceptical Base of Descartes’ Refutation of Scepticism. In: Paganini, G. (eds) The Return of Scepticism. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 184. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0131-0_4
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