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In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies

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Inconsistency in Science

Part of the book series: Origins ((ORIN,volume 2))

Abstract

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

Research for this paper was supported by Ghent University, by the Fund for Scientific Research — Flanders, and indirectly by the Flemish Minister responsible for Science and Technology (contract BIL98/73). I am indebted to Graham Priest for some useful comments on a previous version of this paper.

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Batens, D. (2002). In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies. In: Meheus, J. (eds) Inconsistency in Science. Origins, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6023-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0085-6

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