Abstract
I aim to reject a semantic doctrine, “Incommensurability”, commonly attributed to Kuhn and Feyerabend. They also subscribe to the neo-Kantian metaphysical doctrine of “Constructivism” which stands opposed to “Realism”. I argue that the Incommensurability issue comes down to the Realism issue. On the Realism issue I reject four arguments for Constructivism. Two Kantian arguments make the mistakes of using an a priori methodology and of not “putting metaphysics first”. Two arguments by Hoyningen-Huene and his co-authors support relativism but do nothing to support the Kantian core of Constructivism. I conclude by arguing against “meta-incommensurability”.
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Devitt, M. (2001). Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics. In: Hoyningen-Huene, P., Sankey, H. (eds) Incommensurability and Related Matters. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 216. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_5
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