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The Passion for Reason

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The Law in Philosophical Perspectives

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 41))

Abstract

Moral values play a great role in legal argumentation and decision making. To be sure, both are based on such institutional sources as statutes, precedents, legislative history etc. Yet, even justice is obviously relevant in legal reasoning. This has been the case since times immemorial, e.g. in Rome (where the common law, ius gentium was supposed to express justice), England (law and equity) and also Scandinavia (“lov” and “dom”). In modem law, the statutes are sometimes “read” in the way alien to a layman, in order to obtain reasonable decisions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Unversity of Lund, Sweden

    Aleksander Peczenik

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  1. Aleksander Peczenik
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  1. European Academy of Legal Theory and the Centre of Legal Theory, University of Brussels, Belgium

    Luc J. Wintgens

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Peczenik, A. (1999). The Passion for Reason. In: Wintgens, L.J. (eds) The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9317-5_7

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