Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to propose and analyse simple economic models describing the regulatory policy approach known as voluntary agreements. The term voluntary agreements attempts to capture the idea that environmental goals and/or instruments of implementation are negotiated with the firms to be regulated prior to implementation or at least that there is some freedom of choice (for the regulated firms) with respect to which regulatory scheme a firm is to be submitted. Before defining the concept more precisely we will discuss the related concept voluntary regulatory instruments.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hansen, L.G. (1999). Environmental Regulation Through Voluntary Agreements. In: Carraro, C., Lévêque, F. (eds) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9311-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9311-3_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5156-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9311-3
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