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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

Abstract

The preceding chapter by Schofield develops the concept of the heart for general committee games when preferences are Euclidean. Among other things, he uses it to analyse parliamentary bargaining in multiparty polities. The formal defintion of the heart, H D , provided in Schofield (1993, 1995) for general preferences and a given voting rule, D,are reviewed in Section 9.2, and the application of the heart as a general solution concept are considered in Section 9.3. Two refinements (or subsets) of the heart called S D and I S D are proposed in Section 9.4. Section 9.5 concludes the chapter.

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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Austen-Smith, D. (1996). Refinements of the Heart. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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