Abstract
In this introductory essay1 about the causal quantum theory program,2 I summarize some orthodox views on quantum mechanics, sketch David Bohm’s 1952 version of quantum theory and today’s conventional wisdom about it, examine the origins of this program and the rapid rise of the Copenhagen interpretation to dominance, ask how things might have gone very differently and why they did not, illustrate (mainly by discussing Wolfgang Pauli’s own reaction) how in the 1950s Bohm’s (1952a,b) theory was rejected out of hand, and, finally, outline a landscape of the renewed interest in foundational problems of quantum mechanics I begin by recalling another infamous case, from the early part of the twentieth century, of the scientific community’s dismissing a challenging theoretical possibility without even seriously considering the evidence for it.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For complete arguments and citations for many of the claims (especially historical ones) made here, see Cushing (1994).
The terminology “causal quantum theory program” has historically come to be used to cover a number of theoretical attempts (such as stochastic mechanics) in which the common feature was not necessarily determinism, but rather the actual existence of entities (such as particles and trajectories) even for quantum phenomena. In my historical account here, the “causal program” is used in this wider sense.
Although “Copenhagen” and “Bohm” are two different theories,the expressions “Copenhagen interpretation” and “Bohm interpretation” have become so commonly used in the literature that I often follow that practice.
These include the usual Hilbert-space structure, a correspondence scheme between these mathematical objects and the physical states and observables they represent, rules for calculating expectation values of observables, and a projection postulate (either explicitly or effectively assumed) upon measurement.
Diirr et al. (1992a) have emphasized that Bohmian mechanics is really a first-order theory characterized by Eqs. (1) and (3) together [rather than by Eqs. (1) through (4)]. However, I am here interested in the theory as Bohm himself presented it.
The relevant state-dependent conditions on U were subtle enough to elude Einstein (1953) in his criticism of BM. See Holland (1993, Chapter 6).
The divergent views of Einstein and of Bohr in their debate over quantum mechanics can be seen as rooted in their different styles of thinking (images versus words, respectively), rather than in broad cultural forces that were common to both (Kaiser 1994).
This was the case with action at a distance in Newtonian gravitational theory.
As Fine (1986, 98) discovered, Einstein unsuccessfully attempted a hidden-variables theory in the spring of 1927 (Cushing 1994, Chapter 8; Belousek 1996).Private communication (letter of 8/11/89).
The caveat “often” here covers the possibility of degenerate states.
Only certain modal interpretations may be susceptible to KS-type contradictions.
In fact, Everett’s original relative-state idea is arguably closer to the many-minds interpretation that it is to the many-worlds one with which it is usually associated.
Antony Valentini has recently brought to my attention — and I quite agree — that Louis de Broglie (1928, 118-119) presented at the 1927 Solvay Congress a far more complete, many-particle pilot-wave theory (with a wave function on configuration space) than I indicated in my own book (Cushing 1994, 118-120, 149). For a detailed reconstruction that favors an essentially complete priority claim of de Broglie over Bohm on this issue, see Valentini (1996b). Valentini argues there for an interpretation different from mine on the nature and significance of the de Broglie-Pauli exchange (Cushing 1994, 119-120) at that conference.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cushing, J.T. (1996). The Causal Quantum Theory Program. In: Cushing, J.T., Fine, A., Goldstein, S. (eds) Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 184. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8715-0_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8715-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4698-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8715-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive