Abstract
The dynamics of (rational) belief has been one of the most expansive subjects in philosophical logic in the last decade. Much of the inspiration for this development was provided by Levi (1980) and by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (the AGM model, Alchourrón et al. 1985 and Gärdenfors 1988). Following these authors, most workers in this field have employed models in which a state of belief is represented by a set of sentences that is closed under logical consequence.1 However, it was observed by Alchourrón and Makinson (1982, p. 21) that “the intuitive processes [of belief change] themselves, contrary to casual impressions, are never really applied to theories as a whole, but rather to more or less clearly identified bases for them.” (Cf. also Makinson 1987, p. 384.) In the last few years, formal properties of operations on bases have been investigated by Fuhrmann (1991), Hansson (1989, 1991, 1992a–c, 1993a–c), Nebel (1989, 1992), Nayak (1991), and Rott (1993a–b).
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References
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hansson, S.O. (1994). Taking Belief Bases Seriously. In: Prawitz, D., Westerståhl, D. (eds) Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Synthese Library, vol 236. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8311-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8311-4_2
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