Abstract
The ultimate goal of the enterprise1 is to give a sound and complete, yet descriptively adequate logic for awareness in its relation to human belief. Apart from academic interest this is also important for future communication systems which will be required to act as if they understand how humans think. Like [14] we do not really expect machines to become conscious; however, by describing and implementing formal properties of consciousness we can make computers seem more intelligent and user-friendly.
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Thijsse, E. (1993). On Total Awareness Logics. In: de Rijke, M. (eds) Diamonds and Defaults. Synthese Library, vol 229. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8242-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8242-1_11
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