Abstract
Science studies is a diverse field with many subject matters and a variety of goals. One goal is to develop a coherent, unified theory of science as a human activity. This goal, however, is at the moment far from being achieved, not because there are no candidate theories, but because there are several different general approaches to constructing an adequate theory. The main rivals derive from the major disciplines that contribute to science studies—history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Of these, philosophy and sociology have thus far contribute most in the way of general theory. Historians have contributed much to our understanding of science as a historical phenomenon, but they have tended to be indifferent, if not antithetical, to general theory. Psychologists, until very recently, have lagged behind. Nevertheless, I will argue that it is to cognitive psychology, and to the cognitive sciences generally, that we should turn for the most promising approach to a unified, general theory of science.
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Giere, R.N. (1989). The Units of Analysis of Science Studies. In: Fuller, S., de Mey, M., Shinn, T., Woolgar, S. (eds) The Cognitive Turn. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7825-7_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7825-7_1
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